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The Political Economy of U.S. Public Pension Plans
and Their Unfunded Liabilities
Abstract
Chapter 1 applies a public choice approach to the problem of unfunded pension liabilities and
adopts the methodology of Congleton and Shughart (1990) to model underfunding of state-level
public pension plans using the median voter theorem, along with the theory of “capture” by special
interest groups, and a combined model of the two. With panel data from 2001 to 2009, the paper
finds that the combined model provides the strongest explanation for the current levels of unfunded
liabilities; hence, both median voter preferences and special interest group influence are affecting
political outcomes. The special interest group model slightly outperforms the median voter model in
direct comparisons. (2) Public pension plans in the United States face unprecedented insolvency risk
from unfunded liabilities. Reforming state-level public retirement systems requires legislative action
in most states, exposing the process of pension reform to various political influences. Chapter 2
examines financial as well as political factors of public pension plans, comparing possible political
motivations for pension reform. The empirical results suggest that pension reform decisions are
largely independent from political biases and are primarily a response to pension underfunding. In
addition, the paper examines a hypothesis that news media have an important role in the political
process of pension reform by providing low cost information to pension stakeholders. Empirical
evidence confirms that the dissemination of popular information on public pensions is a significant
positive predictor of legislative reforms. (3) State and local public pension promises to government
employees are binding governmental commitments in most states. Public pension benefits have
multiple levels of protection, including both those associated with contract and constitutional law.
The variety across states provides an unique opportunity to study the constitutionalization of
government obligations. Chapter 3 describes the various legal interpretations of state and local
public pension promises and uses statistical analysis to explore the implications of the various forms
of benefit protections on pension funding as well as other plan characteristics.
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Chapter 1
The Political Economy of Unfunded Pension
Liabilities
1.1

Introduction
Pensions, in effect, shift labor costs from the present into the future, which allows

employees to save for retirement without the temptation of raiding their savings. Governments and
other employers, by contrast, face the problem of contributing enough to their pension plans in
order to pay their future commitments. Unfortunately, this proves to be difficult for most
governments, which often have promised more pension benefits than they can easily fund out of
current revenues. As a consequence, the promised streams of benefits have a larger present value
than the amounts being put aside to pay for them.
The magnitude of unfunded liabilities depends on the assumptions used in the estimating
process—particularly, the discount rate. Taking the unfunded liability numbers as reported by the
plans themselves, Wilshire Consulting (2012) calculates the unfunded liabilities of 102 public sector
plans at around $700 billion for 2011. With the asset levels that 116 of the largest state plans report
for June 2009, Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011) estimate that unfunded liabilities are $1.68 trillion when
discounting at the municipal bond rate and $2.49 trillion when discounting at the Treasury bill rate.
Meredith Whitney, a financial analyst who gained notoriety for accurately predicting the housing
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bust and subsequent financial crisis is predicting a similar series of events with public debt and
public pension obligations, and Harvard economist Robert Barro (2011) shares her concern.
The financial crisis and the corresponding stock market decline and recession exposed the
fragility of the U.S. state-level public pension systems. Funding levels and asset values dropped
substantially. The increase in unfunded liabilities has attracted a great deal of attention from
television to newspapers (The Economist 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012; Laing 2010). The unfunded
liabilities within state and local pension plans have the potential to negatively impact the budgets of
state governments, causing states to default and limiting future public borrowing. Thus,
understanding how the current situation developed and the factors that explain the disparity
between pension fund assets and liabilities may shed light on possible public policy solutions.
This paper uses a public choice approach to examine the determinants of unfunded liabilities
in state-level public pension systems in the United States. In this context, state-level pension
management is not simply a result of expert financial and actuarial advice but is influenced by a
variety of political factors that affect the rate of pension investment, the level of employee
contributions, and the actuarial assumptions adopted. To determine which, if any, of these political
factors may account for the underfunding of pension funds, this paper uses an approach similar to
that of Congleton and Shughart (1990) to explain why large levels of unfunded liabilities have
materialized. The paper develops a median voter model, an interest group model, and a model that
combines the two.
The Congleton and Shughart methodology previously has been used to explain national,
state, and county expenditures. Social Security benefit levels were modeled in their original paper
and state and county road expenditures in follow-on papers (Congleton and Bennett 1995; Ahmed
and Greene 2000). One of the advantages of this methodology is that the correct model is not
assumed beforehand, but rather the researcher develops and estimates three likely models—the
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median voter model, the special interest group model, and a combined model. The best fitting of the
three models provides the most complete public choice explanation for the political outcome.
Section 2 provides background on state-level public pension plans in the United States. A
description of the political economy of public pension plans in the context of public choice
economics is in Sect. 3. There is a brief explanation of the data in Sect. 4. The median voter model,
special interest group model, and combined model are estimated in Sect. 5, with the combined
model providing the most explanatory power and the special interest group model showing a slightly
stronger result than the median voter model. The last section summarizes the results.

1.2

Background on the Landscape and Use of Public Pensions
States structure their public pension systems in variety of ways. Some states have a single

retirement system that covers almost all of the state’s public workers at most levels of government—
state workers, local government workers, public school teachers, police officers, and firefighters.
Other states have multiple pension systems for the different types of government employees.
Participation in the state-level public pension system for local, municipal, city, and county
governments is sometimes mandatory and sometimes optional depending on the state. All states also
have smaller pension plans for state legislators and judges. (Federal employees are not members of
the state pension systems, being covered by their own separate Federal plans.) About one-fourth of
state and local government employees do not participate in Social Security (GAO 2005).1 This
discrepancy impacts average benefit levels since replacement ratios are somewhat comparable
regardless of Social Security participation. The plans that are outside of the Social Security System
tend to provide larger retirement benefits to make up the difference.

1

The constitutionality of the application of the law to state and local government workers was in question when the law
was created; some public sector employers chose not to participate after the constitutionality of the issue was clarified.
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The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) governs and shapes the
structure and operation of private plans, but there is not a similar governing law for the structure
and operation of state and local public pension plans. The Governmental Accounting Standards
Board (GASB) issues statements to guide and influence the management and financial reporting of
public pension plans. Most large state-level pension plans comply with these nonbinding
recommendations of the GASB. However, the guidelines of the GASB allow for broad variation in
the assumptions adopted and the methods used by actuaries and pensions accountants; the variation
from state to state consequently is large. On June of 2012, the GASB adopted two new statements
that address the lack of comparability in the numbers of public pension plan reports and the
overarching discount rate issue.2
During the 1980s, private sector companies began to shift from defined benefit plans—
where pensioners are guaranteed a fixed benefit amount upon retirement—to defined contribution
plans—where pensioners usually control contributions and manage their own retirement accounts,
such as 401(k) plans. Although this shift has redefined pensions and retirement income in the
private sector, a similar shift has not occurred in the public sector. As of 2011, two states—Alaska
and Michigan—offer only defined contribution plans to new employees (Schieber 2012). Defined
benefit plans are still the most common method for providing retirement income for public sector
retirees, despite becoming a rarity in the private sector.
If the disparity between pension assets and liabilities grows large enough, the state must
respond either by increasing contributions (most likely through higher payroll taxes) or reducing
benefits. The latter option is less likely since public pension promises are contractual obligations in
most states and are protected by civil law as well as by state constitutions in some instances
(Monahan 2010).
2

See Munnell et al. (forthcoming) for further reading on the new GASB guidelines.
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In many states when a public worker begins employment, the benefit formula used to
calculate retirement benefits cannot be altered if the change negatively affects the employee. When
contract law is used to protect the prospective retirement benefits of all public workers, this
precedent is known as the “California Rule” and is followed by 12 other states (Monahan 2012).
Pensioners generally can expect to be treated more favorably than bondholders when governments
default. Historically, courts have required pension benefit payments in bankruptcy proceedings when
public entities have defaulted on their debt. Instances include the New York City bankruptcy in the
1970s and the bankruptcy of Orange County, California in the 1990s (Brown and Wilcox 2009).
The era of ironclad pension benefits may be coming to an end, however. Benefit reductions
for current workers and retirees have been adopted in a few states, although they are being
challenged by public sector unions, as in Rhode Island, San Jose, and San Diego (Cooper and Walsh
2012). The future viability of retroactive benefit reductions as a solution to addressing public
pension shortfalls depends on the outcomes of these legal proceedings.
Much of the discussion of pension risk focuses on the downside scenario when not enough
assets exist in a fund to pay the promised benefits. However, upside risks also are present in public
pension plans. An overfunded pension plan creates a tempting surplus pool from which politicians
can borrow or reallocate resources away to pay for other projects. Also, public sector workers can
use their political power to gain benefit increases that are not actuarially or financially sound.
During the stock market boom of the late 1990s, some state legislatures increased benefits
using the assumption that elevated asset prices at boom levels would generate annual returns around
8% ad infinitum; these actions caused larger unfunded liabilities when the financial markets
corrected downward (Summers 2010). Near the peak of the dotcom bubble, California’s pension
system was 128% funded according to actuarial reports (CGA 2007). In response, the state
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legislature passed Senate Bill 400, which included large retroactive benefit increases to public
employees and retirees. Since the bubble burst, California has yet to reach full funding.
Given the upside and downside risks of pension funding, the appropriate funding ratio is
probably somewhere between zero and 150%. The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
considers plans with funding ratios below 80% to be underfunded. Fitch Ratings considers plans
with funding ratios above 70% to be adequately funded (Reuters 2012). Bohn (2011) argues that
because taxpayers are debtors with intermediation costs and voters prefer balanced budgets, it is
optimal for states not to fund their pension systems because the returns on pension assets are less
than taxpayers’ costs of borrowing; thus, the optimal funding ratio is zero—a PAYG pension
system.

1.3

The Political Economy of Unfunded Pension Liabilities
Public pension plans and other forms of employee compensation represent a large and

growing expenditure for state and local governments. Unfunded liabilities present a significant risk
to retirees, current workers, and taxpayers; state policymakers should manage these risks going
forward. By better understanding the political economy of public pension policymaking, one can
better understand the political incentives and other factors that contribute to hazardous pension
shortfalls. If the political process for determining the actual amount of unfunded liabilities works
efficiently with perfect information and competitive elections, the realized retirement fund balance
would be consistent with the preferences of the median voter. Alternatively, it is possible that special
interest groups—public sector unions and other public employee organizations—strategically
disrupt the political process to advance their own aims.

1.3.1

The Median Voter Theorem
Retirement benefits are a form of deferred compensation, and the median voter can use this

mechanism to delay a portion of the payment for labor used to produce goods and services in the

7

public sector. However, the median voter’s ability fully to achieve this intertemporal transfer of
income is constrained by various factors. Ricardian equivalence implies that current voters will
absorb more of these costs in the present if they have an interest in the financial wellbeing of future
generations (in the state of interest). Since the opportunity cost of a public employee’s job is likely
foregoing employment in the private sector, a government employer may need to provide a
significant portion of compensation in the form of wages to stay competitive in the labor market.3
Also, if the efficiency wage theory holds in the public sector to any extent—higher wages and
retirement benefits for public workers correspond to increases in utility for taxpayers—public
entities would compensate more generously.
This paper assumes that older citizens benefit from spending borrowed government money
in the present period. Because the debt payments are dispersed across a considerable period of time
and because of finite lives, the older generation does not incur the full cost of these debt obligations
(Thompson 1967). However, Barro (1974) shows that finite lived voters may also fully take account
of future tax obligations if generations are connected by a chain of operative intertemporal transfers,
such as bequests. In such cases, households will adjust their private consumption and planned
transfers accordingly to account for future as well as present taxes. Nonetheless, the finite lifespan
of the median voter, her mobility, and information costs reduce the extent to which Ricardian
equivalence is likely to characterize voter behavior.
Mobility is a significant hindrance to Ricardian equivalence at the state level because a citizen
can avoid the future tax payments by moving to another state. Also, the altruistic link operating
through the state and local public sector between generations is broken if the older generation’s
children and grandchildren have migrated to other states. Within the United States, moving between
states is commonplace—especially for citizens located close to a state border. Since the supply of
3

For a survey of the public sector labor market literature, see Ehrenberg and Schwartz (1983).
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land is inelastic, property values might capitalize the future property tax liabilities from the
borrowing of the respective government entity (Daly 1969). For federal government structures, debt
capitalization is an alternate equivalence mechanism—a non-altruistic current generation incurs the
costs of state-level government borrowing through reduced property values in the present
(Eichenberger and Stadelmann 2010). If we relax the unrealistic assumption that access to capital
markets is the same for both individuals and the government, it may be optimal for rational
individuals to utilize the government to borrow at more favorable rates (Banzhaf and Oates 2012).
Unfunded liabilities may simply be another instrument through which voters borrow against future
tax receipts.
Additionally, unfunded liabilities may be less intuitive for the citizenry to comprehend than a
municipal bond. The reporting of unfunded liabilities in pension plans is typically more opaque than
financial information on standard bond issues. Thus, it is a reasonable assumption that the median
voter is not aware of the precise costs of the unfunded pension obligations of the government.
Information is a necessary condition for both equivalence mechanisms. If citizens are not
sufficiently informed, they cannot fully offset the borrowing actions of the government through
private intergenerational transfers or capitalization of state debt in property values. The median
voter has little incentive to become informed of the true costs of unfunded liabilities because these
costs include reading through the financial reports, understanding the actuarial assumptions behind
the estimates, and gauging the various future uncertainties—financial, demographic, and economic.
Thus, rational ignorance seems justified. Congleton (2001) shows that the presence of rational
ignorance is sufficient to generate fiscal illusion.
Although fiscal illusion and debt capitalization as they relate to public pension liabilities are
beyond the scope of this paper, it is necessary to make an assumption that the median voter believes
that current public consumption costs can successfully be transferred to future generations. Mobility
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between states and a lack of quality information about unfunded pension liabilities create
justifications that neither debt capitalization in land values nor Ricardian equivalence occurs.
The simple model that follows illustrates the median voter’s utility maximization problem.
Because the median voter is earning a higher income now and expects to have a lower income in the
future during retirement, creating unfunded liabilities may be consistent with maximizing utility,
since the median voter will have a lighter future tax burden.

1.3.2

Special Interest Group Theory
The interest-group theory of government is the alternative public choice explanation for the

unfunded liabilities of public pension plans. Special interest groups shift political outcomes away
from those preferred by the median voter through persuasive advertising campaigns, contributions
to political candidates, and direct negotiations with state legislatures. Steffen (2001) points out that
public employees are a unique interest group in that they can also affect pension compensation
through both the political process and collective bargaining.
Politicians all attempt to win office and need campaign contributions and votes to do so.
Hence, the politician often faces tradeoffs between votes—from acting in ways that are consistent
with the preferences of the median voter—and campaign money—from acting in the interest of
lobbyists and special interest groups (Stigler 1971). If political markets are competitive and
information is perfect, politicians have less demand for campaign contributions since voters are fully
informed of politicians’ positions.
Divergences from the preferences of the median voter may be in the form of subsidies, price
controls, or favorable regulatory statutes, but ultimately, special interest group influence produces a
government-mediated transfer of wealth to specific groups from other groups, including the
citizenry in general (Peltzman 1976). Thus, organized groups can gain at the expense of unorganized
consumers and taxpayers. The political equilibrium is reached through competition among a
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multitude of political factions—with each individual belonging to a number of different groups
distinguishable along the lines of age, occupation, region, and so on—depending on the net gain or
loss of the group from taxes, subsidies, and other transfers (Becker 1983). The effectiveness of the
groups’ abilities to be on the “winning side” of these transfers is determined by the cost of
organizing, the ability to use and manipulate information, and the political influence of the group.
The organization of a special interest group is a costly, but productive step for such groups.
A well-organized group can devote resources to lobbying until the expected gain from additional
lobbying is equal to the marginal costs of lobbying. Since in most states public workers are already
organized for collective bargaining purposes, they are in a better position to extract rents from the
government than other relatively large groups. The members have common interests with respect to
wages and pensions that can be expected to affect their voting behavior and campaign contributions,
and these normal political channels of influence may be “topped” up by strike threats in a manner
few other groups can stage.
Differences in information costs also allow some special interest groups to extract more
resources than others. Members of public sector labor unions clearly have incentives to become
involved in the processes for determining wage and benefit levels and to be informed about the
results of that process. Non-employee voters, in contrast, have little incentive to be well informed
about the compensation packages of public employees. Moreover, the complexity of pension and
other compensation plans and the opaqueness of benefit reporting increase the information costs
for such voters. This lack of public knowledge reduces voter monitoring, which provides an
opportunity for politicians to increase future retirement benefits for public employees without losing
many votes from non-employee voters.
Special interest groups can also influence the information available both to voters and
politicians. If special interest groups are able to present information in a self-interested way—
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perhaps by highlighting certain points at certain times or by emphasizing favorable statistics or
arguments—they can affect the policies formulated by the politicians.
Although public employees will be more informed than non-employee voters, they may not
be perfectly informed. It is unlikely and probably irrational for an individual government worker to
become fully informed about the complex mathematics and actuarial assumptions underlying the
financial status of his or her pension plan. However, union leaders face a stronger incentive to
acquire this information on behalf of their fellow union members. Their interests are not perfectly
aligned with their members insofar as members reward highly visible “results” in the short term. If
so, union leaders may attempt to maximize short-term workers’ compensation packages of wages
and retirement benefits while overlooking the long-term sustainability of the pension system
(Mitchell and Smith 1994).
It is assumed that public sector special interest groups attempt to maximize the present value
of government employees’ compensation packages. Public worker compensation, Z, is equal to the
sum of wages, W, and the discounted expected value of both funded and unfunded future benefits,
where β is the discount factor. BF represents the funds put aside for meeting these future pension
obligations, and BU represents the unfunded future benefits. As the ability of a government to pay
these unfunded benefits declines, the expected value of these promises drops accordingly.
[

]

[

]

(1)

Unfunded liabilities materialize when politicians do not set aside the actuarially required
amount. The public workers’ lobby seeks to maximize wages and benefits; however, within the
lobby group, the preferred level of unfunded liabilities most likely varies with the number of years
remaining in public employment. Self-interested younger workers have a larger financial stake in the
long-term sustainability of the pension fund because they have a longer time horizon. However, for
retirees and workers near retirement, the threat of insolvency is less important because actuarially
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unsound benefit increases take years to create problems within their respective plans. This slight
variation in preferences should materialize in union elections and in the lobbying by public sector
unions and other organizations.
Benefit packages should increase with the number of active members, the number of
retirees, and union strength, while the effects of unfunded liabilities on retirees and active members
go in opposite directions.

1.3.3

Combined Model as a Convex Combination of Pure Models
If elections restrict the ability of public employee unions to obtain more generous retirement

benefits—and it is clear that they do at least within limits—then the effects of median voter and
organized government employee groups need to be taken account of simultaneously. The simplest
approach is the one developed in Congleton and Shughart (1990), which simply assumes that more
complex model outcomes are convex combinations of the two pure models. In this case the key
variables from the median voter model and the special interest group model both will affect pension
levels and the extent of unfunded liabilities.
(2)
Estimates of the weights, Wi , tell us which political scenario, median voter preferences,
special interest group influence, or the combined model better explains the actual outcome. The
function f represents the median voter model; the function h represents the special interest group
model. If WA is equal to one and WB is equal to zero, this is a situation in which the political process
works efficiently and the preferences of the median voter determine the political actions of
politicians. If the situation is reversed, WA is zero and WB is one, the political process does not work
efficiently, and politicians are “captured” or at least strongly influenced by special interest groups. If
both weights each equal unity, the effect of the two explanations is balanced on the actual result.
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1.4

Data
Of course, the future is not entirely knowable, so no direct observation of the extent of

unfunded pension liabilities exists. Unfunded pension liabilities instead are actuarial estimates, and
their magnitudes depend somewhat on the actuarial methodology applied. Although demographic
assumptions are more or less similar, the multiple acceptable actuarial practices reduce the
comparability of state-level public pension data. The three main factors that contribute to this
heterogeneity are the actuarial methods used to calculate pension outlays, the smoothing methods
for calculating the actuarial valuation of pension fund assets, and the discount rates for future
pension fund outlays, with the variation in the discount rate having the largest effect on estimates
(Clark et al. 2011). Referring to the disagreements over the size of liabilities, Brown et al. (2011)
write: “the core debate in this area is over the choice of the appropriate discount rate.”
The standard practice in public sector defined benefit pension accounting is to discount
future pension liabilities at the expected rate of return, around 8 %. Given the current conditions of
the economy and the financial markets, this rate is somewhat optimistic.4 This number reflects the
long-run average returns on stocks during the postwar period.
Economists suggest that future public pension liabilities be discounted at a lower rate
(possibly the risk-free rate) that reflects the legal commitments being made. Pensioners have strong
contractual claims to their future benefits (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2009). Discounting at the risk-free
rate may be inappropriate. Since states pay higher interest rates on bonds than does the federal
government, investors view state debt as riskier than U.S. Treasury Bills—the closest thing to a riskfree asset (Anson 2011).

4

Wilshire Consulting (2011) projects that average long-term returns will be 6.5% annually for the median plan. Initial
returns for the fiscal year ending in June 2012 are around 2%.

14

In instances in which local governments have defaulted on bonds, pensioners have so far
continued to receive the promised benefits, although the bankruptcy of Stockton, California may
change this current paradigm of municipal bankruptcy (Russ 2012). Due to the amortization
component of the actuarial required contribution (ARC), a substantial lowering of the discount rate
would lead to large increases in the contributions—amounts that most states would be unable to pay
in full since state budgets remain strained by the recent recession (Munnell et al. 2011).
Discounting pension obligations at the expected rate of return creates perverse incentives.5
First, it encourages plan managers to invest in riskier assets in order to increase the discount rate and
to reduce the present value of future liabilities. The additional risk from these higher return
investments is not factored into the annual pension reporting. Second, the discrepancy between the
discount rate and the rate at which a state can borrow money in the bond market creates a situation
where states can borrow money at their muni rate (a rate much lower than the expected rate of
return) and put it towards funding future liabilities discounted at 8 %, essentially creating money on
the balance sheet. Referring primarily to local governments, Mumy (1978: 523) comments that the
gap between the rate of return on investments and the borrowing rate is the chief benefit of running
a government defined benefit pension plan.6 One of the weaknesses of using a funding ratio and
unfunded liabilities estimates is that it ignores pension obligation bonds and the additional risks
from borrowing money to manage unfunded liabilities.7
The pension data used in the present study are from the Public Pension Database (2010),
which is sponsored by the Center for State and Local Government Excellence and the Center for
Retirement Research at Boston College. The range of data is from 2001 to 2009, and the numbers
5

Cowen and Parfit (1992) present a philosophical argument against the standard practice of discounting the values of
future government promises.
6
This has been a strategy of Illinois and California, both of which have opted to issue pension obligation bonds in an
attempt to capitalize on the gap between borrowing rates and rates of return.
7
Munnell et al.. (2010) find that state and local governments are more likely to issue pension obligation bonds when
facing budgetary stress and when large outstanding debt levels already exist.

15

are the ones reported by the plans themselves, typically in their certified annual financial reports
(CAFRs). Because public pension systems tend to adhere to the GASB guidelines, many of the
reporting methods of the plans are similar, but these numbers are not perfectly comparable since the
actuarial methods and assumptions vary somewhat among states.
The Public Pensions Database collects data from 126 of the largest state and local plans in
the United States. The liabilities and assets for each state-level plan included in the survey are added
together to provide aggregate values for each state in the year of interest. A state is dropped from
the sample if one of its plans has insufficient data. The editing of the dataset is necessary because the
present paper assumes that the net summations are the total unfunded pension liabilities for a state
although other unfunded liabilities exist in other small plans that are absent from the survey. After
making these adjustments, the dataset contains pension data from 42 states with 79 state-level
pension plans for the years 2001–2009. The state-level public pension plan membership data also
come from the Public Pension Database. These numbers are summed for each state for total
members, active members, and retirees and are used to create percentages—of workers and of
retirees in the plan—to be used in the special interest group regressions.
The population data are the annual estimates of resident population from the U.S. Census
Bureau. The median statistics for a state are used to approximate the characteristics of the median
voter. Median household income estimates come from the Current Population Survey of the United
States Census Bureau and are in current dollars, which corresponds to the values from the pension
data that are not inflation-adjusted. The debt-to-income ratio is the net tax-supported debt as a
percentage of personal income from Moody’s (2010). Similar to the pension analysis of Splinter
(2011), the union data come from the Union Membership and Coverage Database (Hirsch and
Macpherson 2010). The percentage of public workers and the percentage of total workers that are
members of a union both are included in the special interest group regressions.
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Median voter age is estimated using voter participation data by age and state from the U.S.
Census Bureau. The dataset provides an estimate of the number of voters in certain age categories—
18 to 24, 25 to 44, 45 to 64, and 65 plus. Assuming a uniform distribution within these ranges and
using a life expectancy number for 65 year olds from the Society of Actuaries simple life expectancy
calculator online (12.6 for someone 75 years old), the age of the median voter in the 42 states in the
sample is estimated. The dataset does not include 2006 and different age categories were used for
some of the smaller states.8 The numbers are estimated for presidential election years and
congressional elections years, and an average is taken for years in which no congressional elections
were held and for 2006.9 Data from 2000 to 2010 are used to estimate the median voter age for the
years at the ends of the range of the panel, the years 2001 and 2009.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for the variables used in the model estimations.
The average state has about $1,280 in unfunded liabilities per capita with its plan’s cumulative
funding ratio around 85 % for the years 2001 to 2009. Most plans are underfunded, but there are a
few instances of pension overfunding. For most states, about 60% of plan members are active
workers, about 25% of plan members are retired, and the number of retired members of the plan
equals about 2% of the state population. There is considerable variation in the percentages of the
public sector employees and of the total workforce that belong to a union. The public sector union
membership data do not differentiate between local, state, and federal level workers; thus, states with
large unionized federal workforces bias the data. The typical median voter for each state is someone
who is about 50 years old with a household income of about $45,000 dollars per year. The Gross
State Product per capita averages around $40,000. The public debt-to-income ratio is given in

8

Life expectancy is 20.4 years for someone 65 years of age according to the Society of Actuaries Simple Life Expectancy
Calculator.
9
The observation for 2006 is an average of 2004 and 2008; 2005 and 2007 are calculated the same way using the
estimated values for 2006.
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percentage terms, so the average state debt is about 2.75 % of state income. The average cost per
capita for operating the states’ pension systems is low and runs about $5 per person.
Table #1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Unfunded Liabilities

Mean

Median

Minimum

Maximum

Standard
Deviation

1280

967

-6675

15967

2019

0.85

0.86

0.39

1.19

0.15

58

58.8

37.3

84.6

7.9

27.1

26.6

16

43.5

5.4

31.8

27

5.2

72.4

17.6

11.2

10.1

2.3

26.7

5.7

2.1

2

0.6

5.6

0.7

Estimated Median Age of Voting Public

50.3

50.3

45.7

54.9

1.7

Median Household Income

46516

45810

30161

68059

7511

Units
Description
Dollar per
Unfunded Liabilities to State Population
capita

Funding Ratio

Ratio

Assets to Liabilities

Percent Active

Percent

Active Members to Total Members

Percent Retired

Percent

Beneficiaries to Total Members

Public Union

Percent

Total Union

Percent

Retirees to Population Ratio
Median Voter Age

Years

Median Voter Income Dollars

Ratio of Public Sector Workers who are
Members of a Union
Ratio of Workers who are Members of a
Union
Ratio of Beneficiaries to State
Population

Admin. Expenses

Dollars per Adminimstrative Expenses to State
capita
Population

5.3

4.1

0.8

45.3

4.8

Debt to Income

Percent

Public Debt to State Income

2.8

2.3

0

12.1

2

GSP

Dollars

Nominal GSP to State Population

40715

39114

22876

78293

9682

Social Security

Dummy

1 if one of the state's plans is not covered

0.86

1

0

1

0.35

Right-to-Work

Dummy

1 if state is right-to-work

0.48

0

0

1

0.5

The public pension landscape provides a large laboratory in which each state conducts a
separate experiment. The fully funded programs show what works in the public retirement planning
environment and the unfunded ones show what fails. However, what fails is often politics, rather
than the pension programs themselves, which share many features.

1.5

Estimates
The panel dataset from 2001 to 2009 of 42 states allows one to estimate the median voter

model, the special interest group model, and the combined model. The Congleton and Shughart
(1990) methodology uses explanatory power to determine which model is the appropriate one for
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the policy area of interest, here pension underfunding. The models are estimated using a pooled
OLS regression model, a fixed effects panel model, and a weighted least squares (WLS) panel model,
with weighting by per unit variance.
Table 2 reports the results for the median voter and interest group models with t-statistics of
point estimates in parentheses. Joint significance tests on the pooled OLS models suggest
inadequacy, and Hausman tests suggest that fixed effect models should be used for estimation. The
fixed effects substantially improve the explanatory power of the models, while the point estimates
remain statistically and economically significant.
The fixed effect OLS estimation for the median voter model is presented in columns 1 and
2. The model assumes that independent variables, such as the estimated age of the median voter and
the median household income, represent the characteristics of the median voter. Since the point
estimate for median income is positive, this suggests that as the median voter becomes richer she
increases her use of the unfunded liability mechanism. For every dollar of additional income the
median voter earns, per capita unfunded liabilities increase by pennies. The median voter’s share of
the costs of operating a pension plan should influence the funding decisions of the plan.
Interestingly, a dollar of administrative costs per capita corresponds to about $68 of unfunded
liabilities per capita. Thus, some of the costs of operating pension systems appear to be transferred
to future taxpayers through the unfunded liability mechanism or, perhaps, better managed plans with
fewer unfunded liabilities are more efficient at minimizing administrative costs.
Column 2 presents the estimates of the model when controlling for the sizes of states’ public
debts. The level of public debt of a state affects the median voter’s decision regarding unfunded
liabilities. The debt-to-income ratio has a significant and positive relationship with the dependent
variable suggesting that median voters who prefer large public debts also have a greater tolerance for
unfunded liabilities.
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Columns 5 and 6 present estimation results for the special interest group model. The most
significant result is shown in column 5: the ratio of the number of retirees in the state’s pension
systems to the total population has a large, positive coefficient and a t-statistic above 15. If special
interest group strength is positively correlated with the proportion of retirees in a population, this
provides evidence that “capture” by the public employee unions is influencing unfunded liability
levels.
The model in column 6 shows the effect of different time horizons of the members of a
public pension system and the differing effects of public and total workforce unionization. The
percentage of active workers in a state’s pension system has a negative coefficient, but the
percentage of retirees has a positive point estimate.
A concern of the models presented so far is efficiency of the point estimates because of
possible heteroscedasticity. Although the OLS point estimates are unbiased and consistent,
heteroscedasticity causes inefficiency and biases the standard errors and the t-statistics. Wald Tests
reveal that heteroscedasticity is present in the fixed effect OLS models. Weighting each coefficient
by per unit variance, a WLS model estimates the median voter model and the special interest group
model with and without fixed effects, as shown in columns 3 and 4 and columns 7 and 8. The WLS
models also substantially improve the explanatory power over their OLS counterparts, increasing the
coefficients of multiple determination.
WLS allows for the inclusion of time invariant dummy variables that are incompatible with
the state fixed effects dummies. A negative point estimate for the Social Security dummy variable
indicates that states that do participate in Social Security have fewer unfunded liabilities per capita. If
pension replacement ratios are somewhat comparable across states regardless of participation in
Social Security, this negative coefficient may reflect that nonparticipating states have larger
obligations to retirees. Alternatively, participating states may be more prudent.

20

Interestingly, the coefficient of the median voter age variable changes signs from negative to
positive. If the coefficient is negative, this suggests that an older median voter cares more about the
financial wellbeing of future generations. A negative coefficient reflects the shorter time horizon of
older individuals (and an older median voter), since problems from pension underfunding take many
years to materialize. In column 7, all of the independent variables for the special interest group
model are included. These variables have their expected signs and are significant except for the
percentage of retired workers, which loses significance (probably because of the inclusion of the
retirees to population ratio).
The unionization variables for the public sector and the total workforce have different
effects; greater total workforce unionization has a positive effect on unfunded liabilities, but
unionization of the public sector has a negative relationship. One explanation is that stronger
contractual rights to pension benefits for public sector workers exist in states with more union
members as a percentage of the total workforce. Greater levels of public sector unionization in a
state may be an indication that the public sector unions are better at representing the interests of the
public workers, perhaps by becoming more involved in the political processes and more
knowledgeable of the complex actuarial methods of their pension plans. The right-to-work variable
is negative, suggesting that these laws do influence unfunded liabilities.
The time invariant dummies and retirees to population ratio variable are removed to estimate
WLS models with fixed effects in columns 4 and 8. All of the point estimates are economically and
statistically significant with their expected signs. The estimation results appear to support both the
median voter and the special interest group “capture” narratives.
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Table #2
Regression Results for Median Voter and Interest Group Models

Constant
Age
Income
Admin Expense

1
2
OLS
OLS
Fixed EffectsFixed Effects
-13724***
-15453***
(-4.16)
(-4.64)
132**
156.45***
(2.2)
(2.6)
0.172***
0.163***
(9.95)
(9.3)
68.49***
62.1**
(2.77)
(2.53)

Social Security
Public Debt
% Workers

349***
(2.7)

3
WLS
2832**
(2.15)
-59.19**
(-2.36)
0.026***
(5.59)
83.69***
(5.06)
-980.5***
(-8.57)
182.8***
(7.07)

4
5
6
WLS
OLS
OLS
Fixed EffectsFixed EffectsFixed Effects
-7124***
-4482***
3041*
(-4.97)
(-11.65)
(1.74)
66.92***
(2.65)
0.105***
(13.01)
79.51***
(3.86)

7
WLS
1875***
(5.34)

8
WLS
Fixed Effects
3090***
(4.86)

-533.53***
(-5.78)
284.14***
(3.53)
-134.91***
(-7.29)
190.85***
(5.78)
-21.57
(-0.63)
140.93
(1.45)

-16.31***
-113.5***
(-3.59)
(-15.88)
% Retired
9.84
186.58***
(1.14)
(14.00)
% Public Union
-59.22***
-21.56*
(-12.79)
(-1.87)
% Total Union
74.75***
104.68***
(4.87)
(3.24)
% Public Retirees
278136***
101416***
(15.13)
(11.88)
Right-to-Work
-985.61***
(-10.03)
R-squared
0.708
0.714
0.501
0.824
0.762
0.71
0.652
0.882
F-stat
18.353
18.447
74.805
34.46
25.482
18.027
98.904
55.137
Note: The dependent variable is unfunded liabilities per capita. t-statistics are in parentheses; asterisks denote significance at the
1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels on a two tailed test.

The estimation results for the combined model are shown in Table 3. The ratio of retirees to
state population is significant above the 99 % level when state fixed effects are included or excluded
in columns 3 and 4. All of the special interest group variables are statistically and economically
significant in column 1, but the unionization variables lose significance when state fixed effects are
added in column 2. The median voter variables are significant in the fixed effects model of column 2
with their expected signs. When all of the dependent variables in the median voter and special
interest group models are included in a pooled OLS model in column 3, the estimates suggest that
both median voter variables and special interest group variables influence the level of unfunded
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liabilities per capita. Column 4 provides the estimates for a similar model with fixed effects; the dual
influence of both these public choice hypotheses is confirmed and is stark; public retirees to
population and median income are the only variables that are statistically and economically
significant. To account for heteroscedasticity, the WLS model is estimated with and without fixed
effects in columns 5 and 6. The WLS results are similar to the OLS and fixed effect results, but,
surprisingly, the median income variable is insignificant with fixed effects in column 6.

Table #3
Regression Results for the Combined Model
1
OLS

2
3
4
5
6
OLS
OLS
OLS
WLS
WLS
Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects
Constant
3533
-8366**
746
-10953***
1093
-6745***
(1.15)
(-2.41)
(0.24)
(-3.1)
(1.04)
(-6.39)
Age
-30.68
125.87**
14.85
83.08
-16.23
31.15*
(-0.52)
(2.13)
(0.26)
(1.48)
(-0.86)
(1.87)
Income
0.0307**
0.09***
0.03**
0.0478**
0.0331***
0.007
(2.09)
(3.90)
(2.17)
(2.14)
(6.17)
(0.93)
Admin Expense
60.36***
57.62**
22.34
23.76
26.54***
2.69
(2.93)
(2.39)
(1.10)
(-1.04)
(2.86)
(0.25)
Social Security
-530.45**
588.97***
(-2.19)
(6.26)
Public Debt
214.95***
35.52
184.99***
125.42***
(4.11)
(0.28)
(9.02)
(2.62)
% Workers
-76.5***
-85.23***
-36.34**
10.12
-27.93***
22.35**
(-6.05)
(-3.95)
(-2.32)
(0.42)
(-5.56)
(2.49)
% Retired
84.83***
125.15***
1.56
-34.87
21.28**
-48.53***
(4.17)
(3.41)
(0.07)
(-0.87)
(2.28)
(-3.01)
% Public Union
-79.17***
-13.58
-51.63***
14.43
-57.9***
-5.97
(-5.96)
(-0.41)
(-3.80)
(0.46)
(-10.83)
(-0.65)
% Total Union
196.07***
71.36
28.59
23.01
54.2***
3.72
(4.66)
(0.74)
(0.64)
(0.25)
(2.89)
(0.14)
% Public Retirees
91387***
253466***
85920***
287971***
(4.86)
(7.12)
(11.37)
(19.69)
Right-to-Work
-863.24***
-550.05***
(-3.03)
(-4.18)
R-squared
0.227
0.73
0.356
0.768
0.687
0.925
F-stat
15.547
18.5
17.587
22.147
72.936
80.573
Note: The dependent variable is unfunded liabilities per capita. t-statistics are in parentheses;
asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels on a two tailed test.
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Given the significance of the variables from both the special interest group model and the
median voter model—particularly, retirees to population and median income—the combined model
appears to be the best explanation for the current level of unfunded pension liabilities. The results
are a mixed bag as to whether the median voter model or special interest group theory provides a
better explanation for the unfunded liabilities of state public pension plans. Paired Student t-tests,
sign tests, and Wilcoxon signed rank tests are performed on the residuals and squared residuals of
the median voter and special interest group models to gauge which model is stronger. Although
many of the residual distributions were indistinguishable from one another, the special interest
group model does outperform the median voter model in some of the comparisons, particularly with
respect to the squared residuals, suggesting that the special interest group model is slightly preferred.
With the opaqueness of public pension reporting, it is intuitively unlikely that the median
voter in any state is actually aware of her share of the unfunded liabilities from state pension plans.
The strength and robustness of the retirees-to-population ratio suggests that groups representing the
formers’ interests have “captured” politicians and that retirees are receiving concentrated benefits
with the costs being dispersed across the entire tax base. Politicians may overlook actuarial
unsoundness and other pension risks for the purpose of providing immediate benefits to these
supporting special interest groups. However, public pension underfunding should be expected
whether or not the median voter’s preferences are successful in explaining the current funding levels.
Thus, both the median voter characteristics and the special interest group variables explain the
variation in unfunded liabilities across states.

1.6

Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether political factors systematically affect the

extent of unfunded pension liabilities. Three alternative public choice explanations were subjected to
statistical tests using the methodology of Congleton and Shughart (1990). The pure special interest
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group model slightly outperforms the pure median voter model within the dataset used here (panel
data from 2001 to 2009 for 42 states). However, the preferences of the median voter are not
disregarded entirely by policymakers. Both special interest group factors and median voter
preferences appear to affect the extent of unfunded pension liabilities for the period studied.
The strongest determinant of unfunded liabilities is the proportion of retired public pension
plan members to total state population. In the combined model, this ratio remains a positive
estimator of unfunded liabilities when fixed effects and other factors are included in the regression;
it has by far the most explanatory power insofar as it returns the largest coefficient of determination
across univariate regressions on all of the independent variables taken one at a time. Since retirees
have shorter time horizons, they face less of the risk of pension underfunding. Conversely, a larger
percentage of younger participants in a system reduces unfunded liabilities because younger workers
will incur the negative consequences of poor pension management in the future.
In many states, unfunded liabilities present a considerable risk to future taxpayers, especially
if investment performance fails to meet the expectations of the actuaries. The negative consequences
of pension insolvency include higher taxes, lower benefits, state default, larger borrowing costs, and
major budget realignments. Due to their potential to create fiscal crises, it is important to better
understand the factors that have significant positive and negative impacts on unfunded liabilities.
The results suggest that the pure special interest group model is more successful in
explaining the current scenario than the pure median voter model. However, it seems clear that both
electoral and interest group factors affect the size of unfunded liabilities. If these results accurately
depict reality, the political process is not working efficiently, and special interest groups are able to
influence political outcomes with respect to pension benefits, contributions, and unfunded liabilities.
Even if public employee unions do not directly determine pension levels and funding, it seems clear
that they shade the results away from those favored by the median voter.
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Public pensions are very complex financial instruments with opaque reporting methods that
rely on multiple projections and actuarial assumptions that are specific to each plan. Therefore, it is
unreasonable to expect a typical constituent (whether a public employee or private citizen) to know
anything about the long-term solvency of a pension plan; at most, an individual may know the
funding ratio. Thus, it is optimal for citizens to be rationally ignorant of the public pension systems
in their state. However, the fact that median voter interests appear to affect the extent of unfunded
pension liabilities suggests that elections are aggregating information in more or less the manner
hypothesized by Congleton (2007).
Clearly, the optimal level of unfunded liabilities for the median voter is not zero. Facing
constraints, the median voter desires to push some portion of the cost of current public
consumption into the future, creating unfunded liabilities. Also, given the possibilities of upside as
well as downside risk, super-optimal funding has disadvantages. Thus, the paper does not suggest
that in the absence of special interest group influences the amount of unfunded liabilities would be
zero, but rather that the actual level of unfunded liabilities is greater than that sought by the median
voter.
Given the increase in legislative activity regarding pension underfunding, the political sources
of these future burdens are relevant to reforms. According this paper, special interest groups
(specifically those that do not have a direct long-term interest in the payment of the promised
benefits) and preferences of the median voter (to delay payment for current public consumption) are
the main drivers of pension funding levels. This knowledge may be helpful as states look for
solutions and as awareness of the problem is brought to the electorate.
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Chapter 2
The Political Economy of Public Pension Reform
2.1

Public Pension Reforms
Unfunded public pension liabilities increase the probability and severity of potential fiscal

crises for sponsoring governments as well as their current and future beneficiaries. In several states
the current imbalance is large enough to pose major funding and budgetary problems. Munnell
(2012, 8) deduces that major unfunded liability problems are largely the consequence of inadequate
contributions to the states’ pension funds. Moreover, Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009) suggest that
public pension accounting methods considerably understate the “true” levels of unfunded liabilities,
given the overly optimistic assumptions on the pension portfolios’ expected rates of return
(somewhat synonymous with discount rates in public pension accounting).10
Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011) estimate unfunded liabilities at $2.49 trillion when discounting
future benefit promises at the Treasury bill rate and using the actuarial asset values of the plans for
June 2009. Nonetheless, estimates of state-level unfunded pension liabilities tend to be in the range
of $700 billion to $1 trillion when using plan discount rates and plan accounting numbers (CBO
2011 and Wilshire 2012). Most pension researchers agree that the risks of a pension crisis are state
specific (Mitchell 2012; Munnell 2012), although analysts disagree in their assessments of the risks

10

The calculation of the present value of a future lump sum requires a discount rate that is positively correlated with the
riskiness of the future payment. Riskier investments, such as junk bonds, necessitate larger discount rates and
consequently command larger required returns.
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confronted. Given that the total annual budgetary expenditure for all states is around $1,650 billion,
current unfunded liabilities present a considerable risk for taxpayers and state budgets.
Responding to these fiscal troubles, state legislatures have enacted a variety of public pension
reforms, which either reduce promised payments or increase contributions from employees,
employers, or other areas of the budget. These legislative decisions regarding pension reform,
therefore, reflect both state fiscal conditions as well as state politics, in addition to the standard
influences of pension management. This paper analyzes the relative importance of these factors as
determinants of state-level public pension reforms.
This paper examines four possible political explanations for state-level pension reforms—the
median voter theorem, special interest group theory, a benevolent government (or technocrat)
model, and a combined model of the three. If the pure median voter model holds true for legislative
pension reforms, taxpayer preferences as well as fiscal variables—such as income, age, mobility, life
expectancy, etc.—determine the timing and magnitude of the reforms. In the case of the pure
special interest group model, public sector unions seek to maximize compensation—a strategy that
might include supporting pension reforms in certain funding scenarios. Moreover, public worker
special interest groups have an incentive to become informed for the purpose of altering political
outcomes in their favor. Alternatively, public pension reform legislation could be solely determined
by pension financials. In a pure technocrat (or benevolent government) model, legislative pension
reform decisions are independent from the influences of the median voter or the political
manipulations of special interest groups, and the determinants of reform include pension
contributions, expected retirement rates, and the demographics of the pension system. Of course,
the origins of legislative pension reform are in reality quite dynamic. In instances of pension crises,
factors from all three models might synthesize to encourage reform and discourage pension
insolvency.
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The three alternative explanations are subjected to statistical analysis using data that includes
47 states from 2001 to 2010. Tennessee and Connecticut are excluded because of biannual reporting,
and the retirement systems of the State of Washington are excluded because of their complexity and
numerous tiers. A bivariate probit estimation strategy is used given that the two initial dependent
variables are binary dummies that indicate employee contribution increases and pension benefit
reductions as was shown on the Pew Research Center website. To capture the magnitude of pension
reforms, a new pension reform variable is created using the annual legislative reports of Snell
(multiple years). The new measure is used as the dependent variables in count data analysis. The
empirical analysis provides credence to the technocrat model, since the funding ratio is the strongest
predictor.
Although neglected in most studies, it bears noting that information has an integral function
in the political process for legislative pension reforms. Politicians, voters, and the public workforce
use information to form preferences on pension issues as well as to maneuver and strategize within
the political process. In addition, information is essential for detecting potential crises and shaping
pension reform legislation. Low cost information should have a greater influence on special interest
groups, the median voter, and politicians, since pension practitioners are likely aware of problems
before the media. The substantial and recent public pension reforms are largely a response to the
widespread perception of considerable pension underfunding and consequent insolvency risks. The
somewhat steady increase in media focus on public pension issues during the sample period perhaps
stems from greater risks, more awareness of present risks, or simply hysteria. Glaeser and Ponzetto
(2013) create a political economy model of public worker pension compensation in which the “true”
value of pension promises are “shrouded”—meaning that voters are unaware of the true costs.
The next section of the paper provides background information on pension plans for state
and local public workers in the United States, focusing on funding concepts and the standard

29

characteristics of the public defined benefit plans. Section 3 explores in greater detail the different
political scenarios that offer explanations for public pension reforms (the median voter, special
interest group influence, and a fiscally responsible government) in addition to examining the integral
role of information distribution by the news media. A detailed discussion of the data is presented in
Section 4 along with a presentation of the bivariate probit and negative binomial models. The
empirical results are shown in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.

2.2
2.2.1

Background on State-Level Public Pensions in the U.S.
Characteristics of Public Plans
State and local public sector workers in the United States are primarily covered by traditional

defined benefit pension plans. Defined benefit plans guarantee the employee a specified amount
upon retirement typically either in the form of a lump-sum payment or a life annuity. The benefit
level usually derives from the standard benefit formula, which is the product of the number of years
of service, the final salary, and the benefit multiplier.11 Defined contribution plans, the main
alternative, have individual accounts for each employee, and individual plan members usually control
the investment decisions of their own personal accounts. Given that future defined benefit pension
payments to public sector workers and retirees have strong legal protections in most states, state
governments and taxpayers retain most of the risk in a defined benefit system. The sponsoring
government, if need be, is responsible for any shortfalls—either through taxation or budget
reallocation.
Pension challenges such as unfavorable demographics and unexpectedly low market returns
are universal to both public and private sector plans. Beginning in the 1980s, private companies
began to transition from defined benefit retirement schemes to defined contribution plans,
effectively transferring retirement risk from the employer to the employee. Employees with defined
11

For example, with a salary of final salary of $60,000, a work-tenure of thirty years before retiring, and a benefit
multiplier of 2%, a public employee would receive an annual retirement benefit of $36,000.
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contribution plans incur the full consequences of inadequate savings and poor portfolio
management. After the dot-com bust, private sector plans were criticized for inadequate pension
funding and overly optimistic investment expectations (Wiedman and Goldberg 2002). In turn,
companies, aided by government regulators, reformed some private pension methods. It bears
noting that public sector employees have much stronger legal claims to their pension benefits than
private sector employees. As a consequence, private sector pension plan sponsors command greater
leeway when addressing pension underfunding. For example, many private sector sponsors
implemented pension freezes during the recent financial crisis. Pension freezes, which guarantee
pension benefits that are already accrued but stop further accumulation, are infeasible for most
public sector pension systems because prospective benefits are legally protected in many states.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the guiding force for
private sector retirement plans, is practically inapplicable to government sponsored pension plans.12
Henceforth, state legislatures have considerable liberty with the structuring of their pension systems.
Some states have one universal pension system that covers all state and local government employees;
other states have separate pension systems for each type of worker—one for state employees, one
for teachers, one for firefighters, etc.—or for combinations of these. Pension programs for state
legislators and judges are smaller with different benefit formulas, since employees tend to enter these
positions later in their careers. Some state and local public workers do not participate in Social
Security because the original law did not apply to non-federal government workers; however,
compensation for non-participatory workers tends to be comparable to participatory workers, if not
slightly more generous.13

12

The government plans were excluded from ERISA because there was little available information on public plans at the
time of the law.
13
Due to concerns about the constitutionality of Social Security for state and local public employees, state and local
government employees were excluded from the original law. When the constitutional uncertainty was clarified later,
public workers at the state and local levels of government were allowed to participate; some public retirement systems,
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Although there is no ERISA equivalent for public sector plans, the Governmental
Accounting and Standards Board (GASB) issues nonbinding statements to guide management and
reporting of public pension plans. Most large plans follow the GASB guidelines, and some state
legislatures require compliancy. The GASB does not advocate a single actuarial method, but instead
provides multiple acceptable options. The large degree of accounting flexibility reduces the
comparability of pension reporting across states. Novy-Marx (2013) criticizes the current GASB
methodology for encouraging riskier pension portfolio investment strategies—in particular for
favoring equities over cash. The GASB issued new statements in 2012 to address the lack of
comparability across plans and the discount rate issue; however, Munnell et. al. (forthcoming) argue
that these changes will be ineffectual.

2.2.2

Public Pension Plan Funding
The estimates of unfunded public pension liabilities largely depend on the chosen discount

rates (Brown, Clark, and Rauh 2011). Pension practitioners discount future pension liabilities at the
expected long-run rate of return on the plans’ portfolio (around 8%)—a rate that most economists
argue is too high because it reflects neither the low-risk nature of public pension promises, nor the
recent declines in expectations of long-term market returns (Brown and Wilcox 2009). Brainard
(2010) and most practitioners, however, contend that discounting at the historical rate of return is
appropriate, since state and local governments are ongoing entities with low risks of default.
The standard measure of pension funding is the funding ratio—the actuarial value of the
pension portfolio’s assets to the present value of projected pension obligations. It bears noting that
the actuarial value differs from the market value. The actuarial value, which typically uses a 5 year
smoothing method to reduce the volatility, is a determinant of the actuarial required contribution
(ARC)—the GASB’s suggested contribution amount.
however, have remained independent from the U.S. Social Security System. See Munnell (2012, 24-27) for further
reading.
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Public defined benefit pension funds are rarely ever fully funded in practice, despite the fact
that public plans tend to be compared to the 100% funded ideal. Pension underfunding creates
additional risks, increasing the probability of a pension crisis as well as increasing the urgency and
severity of public pension reforms. States with substantially underfunded pension systems can
theoretically transition to pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems with current contributions financing
current benefits. However, PAYG systems are costly; Schieber (2012, 229) suggests that budgetary
costs would increase 33% for Illinois or Louisiana (two states with largely underfunded pension
plans) if they were to switch to a PAYG system. Bohn (2011) shows that unfunded pension (PAYG)
systems are optimal, for taxpayers (the majority of whom are debtors) generally receive a greater
benefit from reducing their debt levels rather than contributing to pension funds that earn the
market rate of return.
Upside risks are present in public pension funding, although the downside risks (funding
crises) receive considerably more attention from media sources and policymakers. An overfunded
governmental fund might tempt state legislators to transfer resources towards other areas of the
budget. In scenarios of pension overfunding, public sector special interest groups might
shortsightedly lobby for benefit increases. If pervious fund surpluses were diverted to other areas or
were used as a basis for larger benefit promises, a public pension may have insufficient funds when
the time comes to pay beneficiaries. Most state-level pension funds were overfunded in the dot-com
boom of the late 1990s, and many state legislatures increased benefits on the premise that fund
portfolios would continue to generate 8% annual returns.14 Snell (2001) finds that many states were
continuing to increase pension benefits in their 2001 legislative sessions. To capture the reality that
full funding is probably neither optimal nor necessary, Fitch Ratings and the Government

14

California Senate Bill 400 in 1999 exemplifies these benefit increases; on the premise of the 128% funding ratio of
CALPERS, the legislature enacted retroactive pension benefit increases for members and retirees, leading to
considerable underfunding after the dot-com bust.
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Accountability Office consider plans with funding ratios of 70% and 80% adequately funded,
respectively.

2.3

Politics of Pension Reform
The legislative decision-making process for public pension reforms can be understood as a

dynamic process of political interaction between self-interested parties—politicians, taxpayers,
current and future beneficiaries, and the other affected parties. Hence, an examination of public
pension reforms ought to focus on political factors as well as standard pension variables. This paper
compares four public choice scenarios—the median voter theorem, special interest group theory, a
technocrat model (the unbiased political outcome), and a combined model. The methodology and
model comparisons of this paper are similar to previous studies that compare median voter and
special interest groups explanations of outcomes of the political process (Congleton and Shughart
1990). My paper adds a technocrat model to account for scenarios where reforms are primarily
determined by pension factors not politics. Insofar as there are several plausible models of the
politics of pension reform, the empirical results and the comparison of the models drive the
conclusions of the paper, rather than a priori suppositions.
“Reform”, for the purposes of this paper, occurs when a state legislature alters the
characteristics of a pension plan for the purpose of sustainability by either reducing outflows or
increasing inflows. Types of reform that reduce outflows include increasing the retirement age,
reducing the cost-of-living-adjustments (COLAs), lowering benefit levels, and cost-effectively
transitioning to a defined contribution system. Figure 1 shows the total employee contribution
increases and/or benefit decreases for each year of the sample period as determined by the Pew
Research Center’s website. There is a noticeable rise in reforms after the financial crisis of 20082009.
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Three models are discussed below, each of which reflects the interests of different subsets of
the stakeholders in state pension reform. The median voter model represents the political outcome
that is determined by taxpayers; the median voter prefers public pension reforms that maximize
utility from the public sector while reducing present and future tax costs. Special interest group
theory characterizes the preferences of the public workers and retirees, but the success of public
sector unions and their lobbying efforts at altering political outcomes is somewhat ambiguous, due
to differing time horizons and preferences of union members. The unbiased political model
represents a scenario where politicians are making decisions independent from outside political
influences. In addition, all stakeholders rely on information to form preferences on pension issues
and to utilize the political process for their own self-interested objectives.

2.3.1

The Median Voter Theorem
Taxpaying voters clearly have a financial interest in the political outcome of public pension

reforms, being the ultimate backstop of severely underfunded public pension plans. For the purpose
of winning elections, politicians may adopt the preferences of the median voter—a middle-aged
taxpayer in most states. If voter preferences are single peaked with perfect information, this strategy
is successful for politicians, and the median voter’s preferences manifest themselves as political
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outcomes (Downs 1957). Failure of a legislature to address pension insolvency concerns can be
costly for taxpayers, since larger funding shortfalls correspond to more devastating pension crises.
Nonetheless, the median voter, who is concerned about utility, stands to incur tax increases and
reductions in government services from budget reshuffling to alleviate pension shortfalls.
Unfunded liabilities function similar to deficit spending, delaying costs (labor costs in the
case of public pensions) of public sector spending. Given that employment compensation consists
of wages as well as other benefits, lower wages in the present and larger pension benefits in the
future can be substitutes. If a link exists between compensation and productivity in the public sector,
citizens’ utility from the public sector goods and services likely increases along with the wages and
retirement benefits of public sector employees.
Increases in public utility from unfunded pension liabilities may saddle future taxpayers with
larger tax costs. Nevertheless, the actions of private individuals might nullify the intertemporal
transfer of wealth from unfunded liabilities, if citizens change their present behavior in anticipation
of future tax increases and Ricardian equivalence holds (Barro 1974). Ricardian equivalence assumes
that there are intertemporal linkages between generations (such as bequests) and that individuals
save in anticipation of future tax increases. Ricardian equivalence is unlikely to materialize at the
state level, given that individuals and their children can relocate to states with less indebtedness to
avoid future tax burdens. Instead, public debt may affect the values of goods, such as property, that
are immobile and commonly taxed. Debt capitalization, an alternative equivalence mechanism,
occurs when current property values decline in response public borrowing and expectations of larger
tax costs in the future (Daly 1969). Thus, individuals bear the burden of public borrowing in the
present through lower property values.
Independent from the success of these equivalence mechanisms, the median voter is likely
unaware of the “true” intertemporal distribution of the costs and benefits of public borrowing.
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Buchanan (1960) applies the term “fiscal illusion” to the scenario where individuals inaccurately
perceive to benefit from public borrowing at the expense of future taxpayers. In summary, a selfinterested median voter likely supports public pension reforms that appear to maximize public and
private utility while minimizing tax costs, regardless of the actual incidence of public borrowing and
unfunded liabilities.

2.3.2

Special Interest Group Theory
Public sector special interest groups have a clear stake in the outcome of the political

processes that determine pension reforms. Members of state-level public retirement systems are
active in the political process and have a greater incentive than the median voter to become
informed of pension policymaking.15 In addition to collective bargain powers, public worker special
interest groups utilize various channels of the political process to influence compensation levels.
Special interest groups may be successful at altering political outcomes in their favor by
contributing to reelection campaigns of politicians and extracting rents from the political process
(Stigler 1971). Public sector workers are in a natural position to lobby state legislatures and influence
political outcomes, since retirees are already organized for collective bargaining purposes. Becker
(1983) depicts the political arena as a process of numerous competing special interest or pressure
groups.16 Successful rent seeking is not always in the form of explicit increases in retirement benefits,
but includes lower retirement ages and changes in actuarial assumptions.
To address severe pension underfunding, state legislatures have two options: reduce pension
benefits to current and future pensioners or increase contributions to the plan. Public sector workers
15

The recent Wisconsin recall elections provide evidence of the magnitude of public sector employee involvement in the
politics. $43.9 million was spent on the recall elections for nine state senators in August of 2011, and over $60 million
was spent in the recall election of Governor Walker in June of 2012; previously, the most expensive race in Wisconsin
was the 2010 gubernatorial election at $37.4 million (Davey 2012; Mayers 2011).
16
When groups compete for resources within the political processes for state budgeting, no natural opposition group to
public pensioners clearly exists. Nevertheless, municipal bondholders oppose pensioners in the instance of bankruptcy.
Gerson (2012) discusses possible conflicts between public sector workers and other constituencies within the
Democratic Party.
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prefer the latter remedy to the extent that contribution increases come from taxpayers and other
areas of the budget not employee wages. Rattso and Sorensen (2004) suggest that the constituency
of public employees functions as a swing voter with blocking power, overcoming its non-majority
status to promote the status quo and prevent unfavorable reforms. In addition to collective
bargaining and political involvement, public sector unions use the legal system to discourage
unfavorable reforms. Strong legal protections of public pension promises by governments to
employees significantly limit the ability of state legislatures to reduce the pension benefits of current
workers. Hence, public sector unions virtually always challenge legislative benefit reductions in
court, creating legal costs for governments.
The time horizons of unions’ leaderships likely influence special interest group objectives
and lobbying (Mitchell and Smith 1994). Focusing primarily on the short-term, union leaders may
encourage high profile agenda items and resist prudent reforms to the point of jeopardizing the
long-term sustainability of the pension system. On the other hand, public sector union leaders with
long-term time horizons can guide policymakers with management and reforms of the pension
system, being incentivized to acquire high cost information on their plans. Thus, the impact of
effective public sector special interest groups is unclear.

2.3.3

Benevolent Government Model
Most states have adopted institutions, such as independent boards, that attempt to insulate

pension fund management from politics. Insofar as the legislature defers to their fund managers and
pension actuaries, decision-making for public pension systems may be largely independent from the
preferences of the median voter and the political influences of special interest groups. In such cases,
reforms may be based entirely on future pension fund characteristics, such as the anticipated
outflows, expected employee contributions, reserves, and the funding level. In a scenario with a
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fiscally responsible government, a low funding ratio is the primary factor that signals to
policymakers a need for pension reform.
An assumption of the other two models is that politicians are self-interested and that they
make decisions to promote their own political careers whether it is aligning with the median voter in
order to win elections or aligning with special interest groups in order to receive larger campaign
contributions. The benevolent model suggests that that politicians may be less self-interested (or
more sophisticated in determining their long term interests) than the median voter and special
interest group models assume.

2.3.4

The Role of Information
The stakeholders of the pension reform process rely on information to form opinions on the

timing and magnitude of pension reforms. Since only a few voters and/or interest group members
carefully study the annual pension fund reports of state fund administrators, it seems clear that the
extent of information available from mass media sources is integral to the political process for most
stakeholders.
For example, perfect information is a necessary assumption for the median voter model to
operate perfectly. Politicians can only represent the interests of the median voter if the median voter
and elected officials are aware of one another’s preferences. If public pension information is costly
for the median voter to obtain, given the complex actuarial methods and the nonstandard
accounting principles, voters may not know their true interests or, indeed, may largely ignore the
issue entirely (Congleton 2007). The median voter is incentivized to become rationally ignorant of
public pension funding and other issues. It bears noting that Ricardian equivalence and debt
capitalization require an informed populace. Similar informational problems also affect the typical
member of large interest groups, such as public officials.
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This creates a void the news media can fill by lowering the cost of obtaining the information
through collection, analysis, and mass distribution. By looking at the front page of a newspaper or at
the headlines of Yahoo News, taxpayers can more easily get a general idea about the funding of the
public pension plans, for which they are fiscally responsible, than by searching through government
reports. Consequently, their preferences for reform are at least partly induced by mass media
sources.
Public workers have a greater incentive to become informed of the true risks affecting their
public pension plans, but also have information costs and associated biases. Nevertheless, the
leadership of special interest groups can use information to their advantage by releasing information
at advantageous times and manipulating facts in the ways suggested by Mueller and Stratmann
(1994). Likewise, politicians have little incentive to delve deeper than the Certified Annual Financial
Report of their public pension systems—such as examining actuarial assumptions—unless voters
and/or the mass media do.
Given that the outcomes of pension reforms are dependent on the quality of information
available to policymakers, the media play an integral role when outcomes are unaffected by the
biases of the median voter and special interest group influence.
Due to the fact that pension issues are not on the radar of most pension stakeholders,
pension reform is somewhat dependent on the ability of the media to inform the public of possible
pension risks. Boeri and Tabellini (2012) suggest that citizens are more likely to acquiesce to benefit
reductions from their countries’ social insurance and pension systems if mass media coverage
significantly improves available information on these systems. The quality and quantity of
information available on state and local public pension plans in the United States have both
increased over the past decade. Highlighting both the importance of low cost information and the
opaqueness of pension reporting, MacKay (2011) finds evidence of debt capitalization in Los
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Angeles property values after the release of a report that showed unfunded liabilities of the city were
considerably understated.

2.4

Data and Methodology

2.4.1

Exogenous Variables
The statistical analysis of legislative public pension reforms examines data from 2001 to 2010

for 47 states with 95 large state-level plans.17 Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for the
exogenous variables of the empirical analysis. The state-level public pension data is from the Public
Pension Database (PPD) (2010)—a dataset sponsored by the Center for State and Local
Government Excellence and the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. Public pension
actuarial and accounting methods in the United States are somewhat heterogeneous, partly reducing
the comparability of pension statistics across plans. Minor adjustments were made to the PPD
numbers in a few instances when differences with the states’ CAFR reports were detectable.
The funding ratios in this paper’s dataset are cumulative for each state, being compiled from
the large state-level public retirement plans in the PPD. Thus, the funding ratio is the quotient of the
sum of the actuarial values (not the market values) for a state’s large plans and the sum of the
corresponding accrued actuarial liabilities. Public pension membership data for each state and year is
compiled similarly for the classifications of active members, inactive members, and retirees. The
cumulative totals of these categories, along with state population data from the U.S. Census Bureau,
create descriptive ratios, such as the actives to retirees ratio (a measure of transferability to a
unfunded pension system) and the ratio of plan membership to population (a gauge of special
interest strength). The mean ratio of active members to retired members for the dataset is 2.3,
suggesting that on average a state has 23 current public workers for every ten retirees.

17

Connecticut and Tennessee are excluded because of the biannual reporting methods of their large plans, and
Washington is not included due to its numerous tiers.
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Hirsch and Macpherson (2010) calculate detailed estimates of public sector union
membership, but do not distinguish between federal workers and government employees at the state
and local levels. To separate state and local public employee union membership from the federal
bias, I adjust the Hirsch and Macpherson (2010) numbers by removing a Bureau of Labor Statistics
estimate of the federal workforce, assuming a 60% (the BLS national estimate) federal worker union
membership rate in all states.
The median household income data comes from the U. S. Census Bureau and approximates
the income of the median voter. The age of the median voter in each state is an estimate by the
author using U.S. Census voting numbers for various age ranges, assuming uniform distributions
within the given ranges. These estimates of median voter age and state-specific life tables of the
Center for Disease Control produce life expectancy estimates for median voters in each state. Table
4 illustrates the average characteristics of median voters across states; the median voter has an
average income around $51,287 and a mean age of around 50 years old with an estimated average
life expectancy of about 30 years.
To identify risk sharing between public employers and employees, the dataset includes a
binary variable that indicates if a state has a non-supplemental defined contribution pension plan or
hybrid plan that is an optional or mandatory alternative to the state’s traditional defined benefit plan
(Munnell 2012, 201).18 About 19% of the state-years in sample represent an optional or mandatory
defined contribution or hybrid plan for new or current public employees.
The analysis uses binary indicator variables to denote the party of the governor and
legislature of each state, which are obtained from National Council of State Governments. During
the sample period, more state legislatures were controlled by the Democratic Party, but Republican
Party candidates held more of the governorships. The ratio of state debt to state income is from
18

A hybrid plan has both defined benefit and defined contribution components.

42

Moody’s (2010)—a report that primarily focuses on public borrowing at the state-level and excludes
unfunded liabilities.
Testing the secondary informational hypothesis of the paper requires explanatory variables
that approximate the availability of low cost information in the media. The initial variable Goog is the
total number of Google News Citations for each year for the search terms “state,” “pension,” and
“crisis” on March 1, 2012 (Munnell 2012, 2). I calculated two additional informational factors from
the website specific search engine at the New York Times website on May 29, 2013. The variables are
the number of article search hits with the terms “public” and “pensions” for NYT 1 and with the
terms “public”, “pensions”, and “reforms” for NYT2.

Table #4
Descriptive Statistics
Variables

Mean

Min

Max

Std. Dev.

Median Income

51287

35582

73598

7651.8

Median Voter Age

50.58

45.74

56.02

1.82

Life Expectancy MV

29.95

21.7

62.79

4.35

Public Union

0.327

0.0311

0.744

0.191

Members to Population

0.076

0.027

0.15

0.024

Democratic Legislature

0.4

0

1

0.49

Republican Legislature

0.35

0

1

0.48

Democratic Governor

0.47

0

1

5

Republican Governor

0.52

0

1

0.5

83

39.2

117.9

15.6

Acitves to Retirees

2.31

1

4.27

0.6

Non-Defined Benefit

0.19

0

1

0.4

State Debt to Income

2.94

0

12.1

2.17

Google New Citations

1312.3

203

3010

953.3

NYT1

307.5

127

718

219.8

NYT2
No Social Security

121.6
0.256

54
0

288
0

74.1
0.44

Funding Ratio
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2.4.2

Estimation Specification and Dependent Variables
The initial empirics utilize two dichotomous variables from the Pew Research Center website

(both are shown in Figure 1) that indicate whether a state increases employee contributions and/or
reduces benefits during the sample period of 2001 to 2010. The paper uses probit analysis to confine
regression estimates to the probabilistic range between zero and one. Moreover, likelihood of
interdependence between legislative decisions for reducing benefits and increasing employee
contributions suggests a bivariate probit model as shown in equation 1.
The bivariate probit model assumes a joint distribution—the bivariate normal distribution,
—to obtain the joint probabilities for the dependent variables. Reform1 and Reform2 are binomial
variables that indicate whether a state legislature enacts a pension reform with payout reductions or
employee pension contribution increases, respectively, in a given year. The index variables i and t
represent state and year, respectively. The exogenous variables form the matrices

and

, with

the beta vectors containing parameter estimates. Rho is a correlation parameter, signifying the
degree of covariance between the two sublevel probability models of the bivariate probit model. No
covariance of the residuals exists if rho equals zero, and the two dependent variables are perfectly
positively (negatively) correlated with one another when rho equals one (negative one).
∫

∫

(3)
(4)
(5)

Equations 2 and 3 present the compositions of the residuals for the individual ancillary
probit models of dependent variables that comprise the bivariate probit model analysis. Each error
term consists of a portion, η, which is common in both models and another part, ε, which is unique
to each ancillary probit model. The interaction between the residuals of the two ancillary probit
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models captures the interdependence of the two legislative decisions to reduce benefits and increase
contributions.

Table #5
Index of Pension Reform
Values
Zero
363
One
61
Two
24
Three
14
Four
5
Five
3
Six
0
Seven
0
Index Factors
1. Employer Contribution Increases
2. Employee Contribution Increases
3. Reduce COLA
4. Increase Retirement Age
5. Reduce Benefit Multiplier
6. Modify Salary Calculations to Reduce Benefits
7. Implement a Defined Contribution or Hybrid Plan

The binary probit analysis fails to distinguish between insignificant and substantial legislative
pension reforms. Thus, I compile an index to capture the magnitude of pension reforms, using the
annual legislative reports of Ronald Snell at the National Conference of State Legislatures.19 Table 5
shows the distribution of the new variable of pension reform, which represents the extent of
pension reforms for each state and year during the sample period. The values of the pension reform
variable derive from numerations of seven different types of possible legislative pension reforms for
each state and year of the sample period. The seven reforms include the following: increases in the
employee contribution rate, increases in the employer contribution rate, reductions in the COLA,
increases in the retirement age, reductions in the benefit multiplier, modifications of the definition

19

The new pension reform measure derives from Snell (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010).
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of pensionable compensation (the salary used to calculate benefits), and implementations of a nonsupplementary defined contribution or hybrid pension plan.
The non-continuousness and discreteness of the pension reform variable cause standard
OLS regressions to yield inefficient estimates. Attributes of the new reform variable favor a count
data interpretation. Nevertheless, the Poisson model’s assumption that counts be random and
independent events is not met, since a legislature that implements one type of pension reform in a
legislative session is more likely to implement others. In preliminary Poisson regressions,
overdispersion—inequality of the mean and variance—is detected with Cameron and Trivedi’s
regression based tests, violating another Poisson assumption. Negative binomial models relax these
assumptions by introducing an unobserved effect in the error term with a gamma distribution, but
have the same expected coefficient values as the Poisson model. This paper estimates negative
binomial models, using quasi maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors from a
“sandwich” of the inverse of the Hessain and the outer product of the gradient.
(

) (

)

|
The paper uses the more common Negbin II specification with θ=λ/α, α=
λ=

(6)
(7)
, and

. Alpha and theta are parameters that are greater than or equal to zero. Equation 4

shows the probability function. Equation 5 shows the conditional probability of the dependent
variable y, in this paper the new reform variable, on a matrix of the independent variables x.

2.5

Empirical Results
This paper compares a median voter model, a special interest group model, a technocrat

model, and a combined model of the three to gain perspective on the determinants of legislative
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public pension reforms. Bivariate probit regression analysis captures the interdependence between
the two reform variables from the Pew Research Center—increases to employee contributions and
reductions in the benefits of pensioners and future pensioners. The new public pension reform
variable captures reform magnitude. Characteristics of the new variable suggest a count data
interpretation and quasi-maximum likelihood negative binomial models estimations.
Table #6
Regression Results for Pew Data
Median Voter
1
Increase Employee
Coefficient
Contributions
Constant
2.1
Median Income
-0.0000034
Median Voter Age
-0.045
Life Expectancy MV
-0.033
Public Union
Members to
Population
Leg_Dem_DUMMY
Fund Ratio
Acitves to Retirees

Z-stat

Coefficient

Z-stat

Coefficient

Z-stat

Coefficient

Z-stat

Coefficient

Z-stat

0.58
-0.29
-0.81
-0.75

***-1.37

-4.34

0.78

1.25

**-0.96

-2.1

4.49
0.00001
-0.059
-0.047
-0.66

0.86
0.000005
-0.14
-0.64
-0.93

8.31
0.00000051
*-0.14
-0.062
-0.33

1.45
0.36
-1.7
-0.84
-0.46

4.19
0.12

1.22
0.71

4.47

1.14

3.83

0.97

-0.0081
-0.12

-1.1
-0.52

**-0.79

-2.72

***-0.17

-2.85

-0.35
***0.00029

-1.51
2.59

State Debt to Income

Non-Defined Benefit
State Debt to Income

Information
5

Benevolent Government
3

Non-Defined Benefit

No Social Security
-0.23
Google News Cites
Reduce Pension
Coefficient
Benefits
Constant
-1.27
Median Income
-0.0000003
Median Voter Age
0.014
Life Expectancy MV
-0.024
Public Union
Members to
Population
Leg_Dem_DUMMY
Fund Ratio
Actives to Retirees

Combined
4

Special Interest Groups
2

**-0.014
-0.16

-2.14
-0.88

*-0.013
-0.23

-1.95
-1.05

**-0.7

-2.53

**-0.73

-2.56

-1.08

-0.26

-1.24

***-0.18
-0.26

-3.4
-1.2

***-0.16
-0.29

-2.81
-1.3

Z-stat

Coefficient

Z-stat

Coefficient

Z-stat

Coefficient

Z-stat

Coefficient

Z-stat

-0.45
-0.0003
0.29
-0.94

***-1.63

-5.47

0.47

0.86

-0.32

-0.77

-0.007
0.66
0.18
-0.73
-0.72

3.85
-0.0000022
-0.085
-0.025
-0.12

1.07
0.17
-1.47
-0.78
-0.18

4.29
**0.33

1.37
2.07

2.64

0.72

-0.0044
-0.12

-0.66
-0.59

-0.26

-1.14

-0.022

-0.51

-0.023
0.000008
0.009
-0.021
-0.45
3.35

0.94

**-0.012
-0.26

-2.07
-1.59

*-0.011
-0.27

-1.87
-1.39

-0.19

-0.92

-0.17

-0.78

-0.037
0.2

-0.99
1.12

-0.024
0.24

-0.58
1.25

No Social Security
*0.32
1.84
0.2
1.2
0.19
0.96
Google New Cites
***0.0004
3.89
470
Observations
470
470
470
470
Log Likelihood
-287.53
-283.65
-273.69
-270.98
-262.01
RHO
0.657
0.653
0.662
0.67
0.65
Chi-squared Stat
40.67
39.25
38.38
37.69
33.75
Note: The results above are a for a bivariate probit model with the reform data from The Pew Research Center. Z-statistic tests are two tailed; asterisks denote
significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
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Table 6 presents the empirical results of the bivariate probit model analysis for the two
binary dependent variables from the Pew Research Center. Statistical tests on the rho correlation
coefficients for all five models suggest that significant interdependence between the two dependent
variables exists, indicating the suitability of the bivariate probit model. Indeed, state legislatures that
reduce benefits are more likely to increase employee contributions, and vice versa. In addition, an
indicator variable of Social Security participation controls for structural differences between these
two types of plans.
The median voter coefficient effects in column 1 are statistically insignificant, suggesting that
median voter preferences do not influence the political process of public pension reforms. In the
special interest group model, state and local public sector union membership negatively corresponds
to the probability that a legislature enacts employee contribution increases, and a Democratic Party
majority in a state legislature is a significant positive predictor of legislative reductions in retirement
benefits.
The technocrat model in column 3 outperforms the median voter and special interest group
models as the log likelihood ratios and subsequent Wald tests show. A lower funding ratio—a
measure of insolvency risk—leads to an increase in the likelihood of both types of pension reform,
as statistically significant coefficient effects indicate. Moreover, the presence of a non-supplemental
defined contribution or hybrid plan in a state is a significant negative predictor of employee
contribution increases. Public pension systems that promote risk sharing between employers and
employees may better manage insolvency risks. The ratio of public debt to state income corresponds
to legislative employee contribution rate hikes with a significant as well as negative coefficient effect.
The combined model in column 4 explains more of the variation in the dependent variables,
given that it includes all the explanatory variables of other three political models. The coefficient
effect of the union membership variable loses significance as shown in column 4. Nevertheless, the
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exogenous factors of the technocrat model remain consistent in sign and in statistical significance in
the combined model. The addition of the informational factor in column 5 captures the influence of
information distribution by media sources, improving the explanatory power of the combined
model. The informational factor dominates the funding ratio variable for both types of reform.
Interestingly, the age of the median voter becomes a significant negative predictor of reductions in
public pension benefits in column 5, supporting the hypothesis that older voters tend to defer
pension problems.
Table 7 presents the empirical results for the new reform variable with quasi likelihood
maximization negative binomial regression estimation. The coefficient estimate of median voter life
expectancy is the only significant coefficient in the median voter model in column 1. The result
suggests that a greater life expectancy for a median voter corresponds to a reduction in the
probability and severity of a legislative pension reform—at the ratio of one year to about negative
one-tenth of the new reform measure. For the special interest group models (shown in columns 2
and 3), only the political party indicator variable for a Republican legislature has a significant
coefficient estimate; Republican legislatures are less likely to enact pension reforms. 20
The technocrat model for the reform variable in column 4 improves upon the other two
political models with three factors that are economically and statistically significant. Lower pension
funding ratios in states increase the probability of legislative pension reforms. The ratio of active
members to retirees, another factor of the technocrat model, gauges the costliness of switching from
a traditional defined benefit pension plan to a pay-as-you-go (or unfunded) system; retirement
systems with more workers and fewer retirees can pay current benefits with the contributions of
current employees. The coefficient estimate of the actives to retirees ratio is significant and negative.
Thus, it appears that the ability to economically switch to an unfunded pension system discourages
20

Regressions with other political party indicator variables—Republican governors, Democratic governors, and
Democratic legislatures—are not significant and consequently not shown in Table 4.
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legislatures from implementing pension reforms. The indicator variable for non-defined benefit
plans is a significant negative predictor of pension reform. Hence, greater risk sharing between
public employers and employees corresponds to fewer and lesser public pension reforms; perhaps
these plans are better managed.
The combined model in column 5 slightly outperforms the technocrat model. The factors of
funding ratio, state debt, and median voter life expectancy remain significant with consistent signs
and effects in the combined model; however, the active to retiree ratio loses statistical significance
when the political variables are added.
Information has a strong positive effect on public pension reforms as shown by the
statistical significance of three different information variables in columns 6, 7, and 8. One could
conclude that an electorate with greater levels of information is more likely to encourage (or at least
acquiesce to) public pension reforms. The coefficient effects of these informational explanatory
variables are difficult to interpret, since it is unlikely that one New York Times article directly causes
state legislatures to reform a certain number public pension reforms. Thus, these informational
variables only approximate the total distribution of public pension information by news media
sources across the country.
To summarize, pension funding and the distribution of pension information by the media
have the largest influence on the legislative decision to enact public pension reform. The funding
ratio is statistically significant and consistently negative throughout all of the negative binomial
regression models as well as in both the technocrat model and combined model in Table 6. In
addition, the informational factors are significant when included in regressions.
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Table #7
Regression Results for New Measure of Pension Reform

Constant
Median
Income
Median Voter
Age
Life
Expectancy
MV

Medain
Voter
1
1.88
(0.55)

Special Interest
2
***-1.03
(-2.94)

3
***-0.91
(-2.68)

Benevolent Combined
Government
Model
4
5
***2.68
5.61
(4.19)
(1.51)

7
**10.21
(2.45)

8
***11.78
(2.72)

0.000012

0.0000049

0.000006

0.000004

(0.18)

(0.68)

(0.28)

(0.34)

(0.21)

-0.00028

-0.023

**-0.13

*-0.12

**-0.16

(-0.004)

(-0.37)

(-2.00)

(-1.83)

(-2.21)

***-0.103

***-0.1

**-0.11

**-0.11

**-0.10

(-3.39)

Members to
Population

-0.15
(-0.27)

-0.51
(-0.92)

(-2.63)
0.007
(0.008)

(-2.43)
0.32
(0.40)

(-2.45)
0.23
(0.30)

(-2.38)
0.26
(0.33)

0.96

3.15

4.09

3.08

3.15

2.47

(0.24)

(0.76)
**-0.501
(-2.28)

(0.89)

(0.70)

(0.72)

(0.57)

***-0.03
(-4.24)

***0.029
(-4.06)

***-0.022
(-2.98)

***-0.024
(-3.20)

***-0.023
(-3.05)

*-0.38

-0.33

-0.17

-0.22

-0.21

(-1.84)

(-1.43)

(-0.77)

(-0.98)

(-0.95)

-0.45

-0.4

-0.43

-0.41

-0.43

(-1.54)

(-1.34)

(1.46)

(-1.42)

(-1.50)

**-0.11

**-0.11

*-0.102

*-0.101

*-0.094

(-2.31)

(-2.13)

(-1.83)

(-1.84)

(-1.69)

Leg_GOP
Fund Ratio
Acitves to
Retirees
Non-Defined
Benefit
State Debt to
Income

Google News
Cites

6
**10.31
(2.5)

0.000002

Public Union

No Social
Security

Information

*0.42

0.27

0.22

0.13

0.21

0.063

0.071

0.021

(1.67)

(1.13)

(0.96)

(0.52)

(0.77)

(0.26)

(0.29)

(0.085)

***0.00039
(3.55)

NYT1

***0.0014
(2.79)

***0.0049
(3.24)
Alpha
***2.8
***2.94
***2.82
***2.31
***2.25
***2.01
***2.07
***1.97
(5.36)
(5.76)
(5.76)
(5.21)
(4.9)
(4.55)
(4.59)
(4.40)
Observations
470
470
470
470
470
470
470
470
Log-likelihood
-375.95
-379.15
-377.19
-367
-364.82
-360.2
-361.64
-360.2
Note: Regression results are for negative binomial models with the new measure of pension reform as the dependent
variable. Z-statistics are in parentheses; asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels on a two
tailed test.
NYT2
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2.6

Concluding Remarks
State and local government retirement plans in the United States face unprecedented

insolvency risks in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis. State legislatures enact pension
reforms that either reduce benefit payments or increase contributions, or both, to increase the
sustainability of their public pension systems. Since 2009, 43 states have reformed their pension
systems with some of these states doing so in multiple years (Snell 2012). This paper examines
public pension reforms from 2001 to 2010 for 47 states and compares three conjectural political
explanations—a median voter model, a special interest group model, and a technocrat model—along
with a combination of these models. In addition, I create a new measure of pension reform
magnitude and test the hypothesis that information has a significant role in the process of public
pension reforms.
The empirical results suggest that pension underfunding is the most significant determinant
of public pension reform. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the median voter and special interest
groups in the political process should not be hastily dismissed. Although state legislatures appear to
primarily focus on pension financials, the preferences of all stakeholders may align to avoid a
pension default when a public pension plan is hazardously underfunded. The median voter and
other taxpayers potentially face a decline in government services, greater public borrowing costs in
the future, and larger tax burdens. Public sector unions are incentivized to become informed of their
pension plans and be active on public pension issues, for public pensioners of severely underfunded
plans could lose their pension benefits for period time in a worst case scenario, as took place during
the bankruptcy of Prichard, Alabama.
The statistical significance of the informational factors supports the hypothesis that the
distribution of low cost information on public pensions by the mass media encourages public
pension reforms. Voters, politicians, and members of public sector special interest groups likely rely
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on news stories and online articles to form opinions and operate within the political process,
foregoing the reading of annual financial reports and the studying of actuarial assumptions and
accounting methods.
In practice, benefit reductions for current public sector workers and retirees rarely occur
without significant pension underfunding, and benefit payment cuts to the pensions of current
public employees are almost always challenged in court by public sector unions. Consequently, most
pension reform legislation only applies to the benefit structures of future hires. It bears noting that
high-profile and large-scale pension reforms have been attempted since the end of the paper’s
sample period: most notably the public pension reforms led by State Treasurer Chaffee in Rhode
Island and the bankruptcy filing of Detroit. The judicial conclusions of these and other legal cases
will likely clarify the latitude that policymakers have when reforming public pensions. Nonetheless,
this paper sheds a somewhat favorable light on the recent wave of pension reforms; for, it appears
that pensioners’ benefits are not being reduced aimlessly or arbitrarily, but in contrast, for the
purpose of addressing insolvency risks.
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Chapter 3
Constitutional Protections of Public Pension Promises
3.1

The Public Pension Promise
Public workers and retirees of state and local governments in the United States depend on

their employing governments for retirement income, which is supplemental to Social Security in
most cases. Over the past 80 years, state judicial rulings and legislative action have established strong
legal protections for public pension benefits. Consequently, public pension promises are legally
binding obligations for the sponsoring government entities in most states. This paper provides a
detailed description of the legal landscape for public pension benefit protections, focusing on state
constitutional constraints. In addition, statistical analysis shows the influence of the different types
of legal protections on pension funding and other plan characteristics.
The public pension obligations of state and local governments in the United States are some
of the strongest governmental commitments, being nearly risk free (Brown and Wilcox 2009). In
most states, public workers and retirees have legal recourse to recover future benefits that are
reduced from anticipated levels, even if these benefits are not yet accrued and employees are not yet
vested in some cases (Monahan 2012). Relying on case law and statutes, state and local judges
consider a public pension promise to be one of the following: a right, a contractual promise, a
promise, a property interest, or a gift. The legal doctrines that protect public pension benefits
include constitutional law, contract theory, property interest, gratuity theory, and promissory
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estoppel (Monahan 2010; Munnell and Quinby 2012). In addition, these legal protections begin to
cover pension benefits at different points in the public workers’ careers—such as the point of hire,
the point of vesting, or the point of retirement—depending on legal precedents. Benefit protections
are generally strong, despite extensive heterogeneity. Seven states have constitutional provisions that
explicitly prohibit legislatures from impairing or diminishing the pension benefits of public workers.
The heterogeneity of pension benefit protections across states creates a breadth of protection levels;
the spectrum of benefit protection levels provides an avenue for studying the constitutionalization
of governmental promises, which could potentially shed light on issues well beyond the scope of
state and local pension plans.
In this paper, the term “constitutionalization” refers to payments that a government is legally
obligated to pay regardless of future legislative actions. Recently, state legislators tend to favor
paying bondholders over pensioners in order to preserve lower borrowing costs in the future. Public
pension benefits tend to be fixed amounts and consequentially more stringent obligations than
other, more opaque forms of governmental commitments such as health insurance promises. Given
that large levels of public unfunded liabilities from a variety of sources have materialized at all levels
of government in the United States, these state protections should provide relevant insights for the
current public discussion.
Actuarially, state retirement plans should be able to sustain themselves in perpetuity, but
inadequate pension contributions by state governments and other lesser factors have led to the
accumulation of large unfunded liabilities. The legal environment for benefit protections may change
as states have become increasingly less able to pay pensioners. Of course, the expenditure capacity
of sponsoring governments, with budget shifting and potential tax increases, limits the provision of
public pension benefits. Cloud (2011) discusses legal strategies that might allow for the reduction of
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public pension benefits for plans with large unfunded liabilities, foreseeing that courts will allow for
benefit reductions of public pensions in the near future.
Public sector unions maintain inherently strong positions for influencing their pension plans,
through both collective bargaining and the political process. The specific legal protections of public
pension benefits in a state likely influence the political process, affecting pension outcomes. The
statistical analysis of the paper examines the influence of legal protections on plan retirement ages,
benefit levels, and funding ratios in special interest group models. The presence of state
constitutional protections corresponds to pension underfunding. The insolvency of a state and its
subsequent debt restructuring would test the true strength of these legal protections. If state
governments are able to force concessions from public pensioners in nearly insolvent states with
constitutional protections, constitutional amendments may ultimately have a negative effect on
benefits.
Section 2 provides background information on public pension plans, highlighting some
differences between public sector and private sector pension plans. A description of the various legal
protections of public pension promises is given in Section 3 with subsections on current litigation
and bankruptcy law for public entities. Section 4 discusses “constitutionalization” of government
obligations in general. Section 5 introduces the data. The empirical estimations are presented in
Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.

3.2

Some Differences Between Public and Private Pension Plans
The public pension promises of state and local governments are more binding than similar

promises by private sector companies in most U.S. states. Earned retirement benefits are legally
secure in both public sector and private sector plans; however, future unearned benefits, which are
unprotected in private sector plans, may not be reducible for public sector plans in some instances.
Munnell and Quinby (2012) contend that public pension benefits should have the same
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conditionality as private pension plans, which would allow state legislatures the flexibility to reduce
future pension outflows when addressing pension underfunding.
Public pension plans are not subject to the regulation of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA), the primary law governing private pension plans. Public retirement plans are
also excluded from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a compulsory governmental
insurance program for private sector pension plans. Thus, state, rather than national, taxpayers are
the eventual financial backstop for these public retirement plans in cases of near insolvency or a
negative tail-risk scenario.
Given the lack of federal government oversight, state legislators can attune their public
pension systems to the specific economic and political circumstances of their state. Nonetheless, the
standard method for providing retirement income to state and local government employees remains
the traditional defined benefit plan, in which the participants are guaranteed a specified retirement
income upon retirement. A benefit formula—typically, the product of the number of working years,
final salary, and a benefit multiplier—determines the level of retirement income.
Some states have a single public pension system that covers all state and local public workers
(of course, excluding federal government workers who have their own federal pension plans), yet
others have separate retirement systems for the different types of public employees. In addition,
some local jurisdictions have their own smaller retirement plans that are exclusively for their public
workers. It bears noting that the members of some state and local pension plans do not participate
in the United States Social Security system; non-participatory members typically receive slightly
larger benefits and prefer to maintain their independence.21

21

A large portion of voters would probably be surprised to learn that the benefits of these federal programs have neither
constitutional nor legal protections that are comparable to those of state and local public pension obligations. Legally,
the U.S. Congress along with the President could stop Social Security and Medicare payments with legislation. Of course,
politicians would suffer severe ramifications at the ballot box from outraged constituents. See Hawes (2004) for a
discussion of possible legal protections of Social Security promises.

57

The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) issues statements with strong (but
optional) suggestions that provide guidance to public entities in regards to the actuarial assumptions,
accounting methods, and financial reporting of their pension plans. Many academics of economics
and finance criticize the GASB’s suggested discount methods of future pension liabilities; public
pension liabilities are typically discounted at the expected rate of return on the corresponding
investment portfolio, about 8%—a rate too high for justification with basic financial theory (NovyMarx 2013; Munnell 2012; Novy-Marx and Rauh 2009; Mitchell 2012).22 The GASB recently
released new statements to address the discount rate issue and improve the comparability of public
pension reporting. Munnell et al (forthcoming), one of the foremost academic researchers in the area
of public retirement plans, is doubtful of their effectiveness.

3.3

Legal Protections of Public Pension Benefits
The pension promises of public retirement plans are different in nature from private sector

pension plans, given that the sponsoring government entities create and adjudicate the law in their
respective jurisdictions. Moreover, public pension promises by state and local governments are some
of the strongest governmental commitments to citizens in the United States. State governments
maintain the legal right to repudiate their bond debt; using constitutional law and contract theory,
however, many states prohibit the diminishment of future public pension benefits (in some cases
benefits that are not yet accrued). Indeed, public pensioners have gotten precedence ahead of
municipal bondholders in the bankruptcy proceedings of New York City in the 1970s and Orange
County, California in the 1990s (Brown and Wilcox 2009). That is to say, public pensioners, in many
states, face a historically lower risk of default on payments than municipal bondholders and other
claimants.

22

Theoretically, riskier future payments require a larger discount rate. A riskier lump sum payment is worth less in the
present than a similar but less risky lump sum, given the lower probability of the payment being made.
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3.3.1

The Various Legal Interpretations of Public Pension Benefits
State and local public retirement plans are almost exclusively subject to state laws, since state

governments are partly distinct sovereign entities in the United States’ system of fiscal federalism.
State courts interpret public pension benefits under a variety of legal doctrines, including benefits as
gratuities from the state, as contractual benefits between the public employer and the public
employee, as quasi-contractual benefits enforced by promissory estoppel, and as the beneficiaries
having a property interest in the benefits. In addition, some states have clauses in their state
constitutions that prohibit the impairment and diminishment of public pension benefits.
Prior to the twentieth century, many of the initial public pensions from state governments
were entirely arbitrary enactments by state legislatures. Consequently, courts originally interpreted
pensions as gratuities (gifts from the state). Gratuity theory interpretation implies that public pension
obligations are adjustable, upwards as well as downwards, subjecting public pensioners to
considerable political risks. Case law has shifted in most states to provide stronger protections of
public pension benefits, with the exceptions of Texas and Indiana. In 2000, the Arkansas Supreme
Court ruled that actual pension contributions by public employees (not de facto employee
contributions that are paid by employers) are a requirement for benefits not to be interpreted as
gratuities, weakening the claims of public employees who make no direct contributions to their
plans.23
The interpretation of public pension benefits as property interest offers an alternative legal
protection. If public employees have a property interest in their pension benefits, state legislatures
must use due process and successfully utilize the takings clause when diminishing the retirement
payments to public sector workers. That is, states must provide just compensation to the impaired
individual and use the taken property for a public purpose. Generally, strengthening the financials of
23

Robinson v. Taylor, 29 S.W.3d 691, 694 (Ark. 2000).
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a public pension plan is not a legally accepted public purpose, although recent budgetary woes may
change this standard.
Minnesota applies the legal doctrine of promissory estoppel to public pension benefits when
a contract is not explicitly created by the legislature (Monahan 2010). Minnesota courts view public
pension benefits as a promise, in the legal sense, to public sector workers and assume that public
workers have relied on the expectation of these payments when making other decisions. This quasicontractual principle establishes slightly weaker legal protections than the more common contract
theory.
Courts in most states use contract theory to interpret public pension benefits. As part of the
compensation agreement, public workers and their public employers create an implicit contract
upon the point of hire, vesting, or retirement, according to the legal custom of the state. The
compensation package is an influential factor in the decision-making process of potential
government workers, given that the labor market is competitive with employment options in the
public as well as private sectors. It bears noting that contract theory is more applicable to the private
sector labor market and that legislative enactments rarely create legal contracts between individuals
and the state.
If a state establishes contract theory protections for public pension benefits, ambiguity exists
over the proper legal classification of the employing government in the contract—the sovereign
power or the employer-side of the contract. In the context of the government as a sovereign power,
a contract breach would be admissible if it serves a public purpose.24 Contract infringements must
undergo a three part judicial test: (1) did a contract exist? (2) was there an infringement? (3) did this
infringement serve a public purpose? In addition by exercising their sovereign immunity powers,
state governments might be able to reduce pension benefits and avert legal challenges from impaired
24

The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution and nearly identical clauses in most state constitutions prevent
governments from infringing on private contracts, unless it is for some imperative public purpose.
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pensioners.25 Alternatively, state or local governments that maintain the role of the contracting
employer may only break the contract according to the doctrine of excuse—the legal standard for
private parties.

Table #8
State Constitutional Protections
State
Alaska
Arizona
Hawaii
Illinois
Louisiana
Michigan
New York

Year Included
1956
1998
1978
1970
1974
1963
1938

Source: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College

As shown in Table 8, seven states go beyond a contract theory interpretation to include
provisions in their state constitutions that specifically protect public pensioners from impairments
and diminishments of benefits. The state constitutions of Illinois and Michigan provide
representative samples of the constitutional provisions of all seven states.
Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any
unit of local government or school district, or any agency or
instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual
relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or
impaired.26
The accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and retirement
system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual
obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired
thereby.27
These constitutional provisions as well as the other five establish a contractual nature for the public
pension benefits and forbid the diminishment or impairment. A noticeable distinction of state

25

Sovereign immunity is being used by New Jersey in public sector union lawsuits. New Jersey Education Association
versus State 11-5024.
26
Constitution of the State of Illinois, Article XIII, Section 5
27
Constitution of the State of Michigan, Article IX, Section 24
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constitutional clauses is the inclusion of the phrase “accrued benefits”, like in that of Michigan as
well as others. Yet this difference appears to be primarily linguistic, for judicial interpretation
overrides the accounting or actuarial implications from the phrase. State courts seem to apply these
constitutional protections to past benefits and future benefits uninfluenced by the exact phrasing of
the constitutional amendment. Without any explicit reference in its constitutional provision, Alaska
courts extend the state constitutional protections to cover health insurance benefits for public
workers and retirees. Thus, judges have considerable discretion in the application of constitutional
protections.

3.3.2

Further Discussion of Benefit Protections

Independent from the legal interpretation of public pension promises in a state, the legal
protections for benefits begin at different points in the workers’ careers depending on the state’s
case law. Virtually all states protect public pensioners from benefit reductions after retirement, with
the exception of the two states that continue to use a gratuity approach. Most states protect pension
benefits from either the point of vesting or the point of hire. Legal protections in some states
include prospective benefits—future benefits that are expected but not yet earned; after an employee
is hired in states where protections begin from the point of hire, his or her benefit formula cannot
be impaired without an offsetting benefit increase of some type.
Legislative enactments that reduce public pension benefits often invoke costly and lengthy
lawsuits from public sector unions. To avoid litigation and political consequences, legislators usually
enact pension reforms that only apply to future hires or nonvested employees, not current retirees or
vested members. The legal scope of pension benefit impairments is not limited to pension
reductions; some state courts include legislative enactments that increase employee contributions as
impairments to the contract between the public employer and the public employee. The Arizona
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state legislature passed employee contribution increases to improve the funding status of the
Arizona State Retirement System only to have these increases overturned in court.28
Taking advantage of their benefit formulas and pension systems, some public employees
engage in “spiking” to earn retirement benefits well beyond the actuarial projection. Beerman (2013)
suggests that courts might interpret benefits earned from “spiking” differently and allow for
reductions of these ill-gotten government benefits.

3.3.3

Bankruptcy Solutions
Federal bankruptcy courts provide a means for some local governments to partly shed the

fiscal burden of their pension funds. Given that bankruptcy occurs in federal courts, its rulings
override state law as well as state constitutional provisions. Nonetheless, the overseeing state
government must authorize the bankruptcy filing of a local government. The legal landscape of
these authorizations is diverse across states; five classifications of state law exist in the authorization
of bankruptcy filings by local governments—states that explicitly authorize filings, states that
conditionally authorize filings, states that limit authorization, states that prohibit authorization, and
states that have unclear or no laws regarding municipal bankruptcy (Spiotto et al. 2012).
The probability of a state insolvency scenario is increasing as unfunded liabilities and state
debt have grown since the recent recession. Insolvency scenarios for states are not a new
phenomenon. During the Great Depression, Arkansas defaulted on its bonds for road construction
but eventually refinanced, and overexpansion of infrastructure in the 1830s, mostly from the
building of canals, led to default and repudiation of state debt throughout the nineteenth century.
Dove (2012) finds that state constitutional amendments put in place after these defaults in the
nineteenth century raised bond prices, suggesting that bond markets perceived these constitutional

28

The court case is Barnes versus Arizona State Retirement System (2011).
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constraints as credible commitments. Courts in the United States have historically upheld a state’s
right to repudiate its debts, although this action invariably increases future borrowing costs.
Skeel (2012a, 2012b) makes the case that municipal bankruptcy protections or a similar type
of debt restructuring should be extended to the states. State-level policymakers resist such action in
fear of disturbing municipal bond markets. When considering the state government as an employer,
state bankruptcy makes logical sense, given that governments could renegotiate contracts with
employees. Furthermore, bankruptcy for state governments might be beneficial to the extent that it
can isolate debt renegotiation from the political process. Nevertheless, politicians might use
bankruptcy as a shield for politically unpopular actions, such as preserving future borrowing
opportunities at expense of resident beneficiaries and public services.

3.3.4

Litigation: Recent and Current
The legal interpretation of public pension benefit protections is an active area of the law

with more than 53 significant lawsuits between the start of 2009 and April of 2013 (Buck 2013).
Most public pension ligation takes place in local and district courts, involving challenges from public
sector unions to pension reforms that impair public pension benefits (Buck 2012). The recent wave
of municipal bankruptcies along with the growing inability of governments to pay liabilities may
catalyze a shift in the legal understanding of both public pension promises and the strengths of the
various benefit protections. Thus, the binding nature of state and local government pension
commitments remains largely uncertain, until legal challenges of benefit reductions traverse court
systems in states across the country.
Before the recent financial crisis, the general consensus was that negative public pension
benefit adjustments were off limits in governmental debt restructurings. Nevertheless, an
insufficiency of funds tends to necessitate some form of benefit reduction for pensioners. The City
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of Prichard, Alabama, which entered bankruptcy in 2009, stopped paying pensioners for the
duration of the bankruptcy, despite a state law obligating the city to pay its pensioners in full.
Cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) are no longer considered part of the inalterable portion
of the public pension benefit after judicial rulings in Colorado, Minnesota, and South Dakota. An
earlier lawsuit against the City of Omaha, Nebraska exemplifies the abandoned precedent, where
courts rejected an attempt by the city to reduce its COLAs for the purpose of shoring up its pension
fund.29
Policymakers of overburdened jurisdictions tend to pay bondholders before pensioners,
preserving low borrowing rates in the future. Central Falls, Rhode Island—a city with a population
of 1,900—took this tactic, having a local public pension plan under 50% funded before entering
bankruptcy; pensions above $10,000 were cut by 55% in the settlement, with the state providing
partial relief to pensioners during the first five years (Bidgood 2012; Simon 2013). Addressing a $7
billion shortfall, the state of Rhode Island passed the Rhode Island Retirement Security Act of 2011
that reduces the benefits of current workers as well as pensioners (Pew 2012). Multiple public sector
unions have challenged the Rhode Island reforms, and as of the writing of this paper, the lawsuits
remain in mediation.
The California cities of Mammoth Lakes, Stockton, San Bernardino, and Vallejo have
applied for bankruptcy protections since the recent financial crisis. The judicial system of California
maintains one of the strongest forms of benefit protections—what Monahan (2012) refers to as the
“California Rule”—using contract theory to protect all anticipated benefits from the point of hire.
San Jose and San Diego passed referendums in 2012 that reduce the benefits for both public
employees and public pensioners. Public sector unions challenge virtually all reductions of public

29

Calabro versus City of Omaha (1995)
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pension benefits in California. Initial court rulings in California have been favorable to the public
sector workers, but these public pension lawsuits have yet to reach the state’s highest court.
New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, along with the state legislature, enacted controversial
public pension reforms in 2010, reducing public pension benefits. Public sector unions contested
these reforms in court. Up to the writing of the paper, the state of New Jersey has been able to
successfully utilize the doctrine of sovereign immunity to maintain its public pension cuts, and
public sector unions continue to appeal decisions.
Detroit applied for bankruptcy protection in July 2013, attempting to gain concessions from
both bondholders and pensioners. The fact that bankruptcy proceedings take place in federal courts,
not subject to state law, was a motivation for Detroit’s emergency manager Kevyn Orr to file for
Chapter 9 bankruptcy protections. Michigan law prohibits local governments from impairing or
diminishing public pension benefits by constitutional amendment. Given the size of the bankruptcy
(the largest in history at $18.2 billion or $27,000 per resident)30, its legal conclusions will provide
some clarity to the limits of benefit protections and perhaps set a precedent for large municipal
bankruptcies in the future.

3.4

Constitutionalized Government Promises
When public promises are constitutionalized, neglected beneficiaries have legal recourse to

claw-back unpaid government obligations. Without constitutionalization of government payments,
the political channel is the principal means for individuals to preserve their future payments as
promised. Constitutionalization of pension payments offers protection to beneficiaries against the
political risk of benefit reductions, setting a minimum amount but not preventing pension increases.
Municipal bondholders, like public pensioners, are government beneficiaries with
constitutionalized governmental obligations. However, public debt holders are less likely to involve
30

Numbers are from The Economist (2013).
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themselves in the political process for the following two reasons. First, municipal bondholders are
less likely to live in-state and consequently have a weaker influence in relevant elections. To contrast,
almost all active members of a public retirement system and a large portion of retirees live in-state,
boosting special interest group influence in the political process. Glaeser and Ponzetto (2013) show
that the portion of retirees that reside in the state of their pension system impacts pension
compensation levels. Second, municipal bondholders have little upside from lobbying in the political
process, since bond payment amounts are fixed barring default or repudiation.
The spectrum of public pension benefit protections by states provides a framework to study
the topics of constitutionalization and constitutionalization at the margin. Judicial decisions
determine the degree of constitutionalization in most states; however, state legislatures implement
constitutional amendments in some instances. As far as the legal constraints are determined by the
judicial system, the degree of constitutionalization is mainly exogenous from the political influences;
however, the method of judicial selection in a state might influence judicial decision-making—
perhaps from the politicization of judicial elections.
A question of causality exists, since the legislature determines both the spending level and
the institutions. Legal protections have greater independence from political influences to the extent
that they are determined by apolitical judges. Unlike most of the other legal protections,
constitutional provisions are determined by state legislatures in most instances; however, all
constitutional amendments predate the sample period of the paper, in most cases by over 25 years.
Thus, this paper assumes that state constitutional provisions exogenously influence other pension
factors. The interdependence of pension and political characteristics with specific benefit
protections, in the context of constitutionalization, illuminate useful insights into public pensions as
well as broader insights into governmental promises.
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The fact that constitutionalization mitigates default risk on future government payments
provides value to self-interested beneficiaries. That is to say, there exists some larger level of
unconstitutionalized benefits and a lesser level of constitutionalized benefits over which a recipient
would be indifferent. Constitutionalization of future retirement benefit payments may provide a
way for policymakers to save money in the present by reducing wages and retirement incomes and
freeing up resources to be spent elsewhere; essentially, public workers exchange retirement income
for security of that income. If constitutional protections accompany budgetary as well as pension
troubles, however, constitutionalization may be a reason for these shortfalls.
Public sector unions form special interest groups to influence the political process that
determines their pension outcomes. Public sector special interest groups likely prefer sustainable
government retirement systems that are well funded. A constitutional provision might lead to
overconfidence by the plan members in a state’s ability to pay. If public sector unions view
themselves as first in line in any debt renegotiating proceedings, they will likely shift to other
objectives, such as lower retirement ages and large benefit levels. Thus, constitutional provisions
could lead to a reduction in monitoring by special interest groups with regards to the solvency of a
public pension plan. Due to the high cost of information, public sector unions could be integral to
guiding pension policymaking, given that special interest groups, of all the pension stakeholders in
the political process, likely have the largest incentive to become informed of the true solvency risks
of their retirement system.
Benevolent politicians would exert additional efforts to ensure full funding of their pension
systems in an ideal scenario. Nevertheless, there may be a natural tradeoff between pension
underfunding (preferred by current politicians with short-term time horizons) and constitutional
provisions (preferred by the public-sector workforce), when politicians and beneficiaries are
assumed to be self-interested. Thus, state constitutional benefit protections appear to negatively
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impact pension funding—a counterintuitive result. These constitutional protections essentially fail if
a state can shed its future pension liabilities through debt restructuring or something similar to
Chapter 9 bankruptcy in federal courts.

3.5

Description of the Dataset
The dataset consists of 47 states and covers the years 2001 to 2010.31 The classifications for

states’ legal protections of benefits are taken from Munnell and Quinby (2012) as shown in Table
9.32 There are five legal doctrines that states use to protect public pension benefits—constitutional
law, contract theory, property interest, promissory estoppel, and gratuity theory. Depending on the
case law of the state, legal protections may be applied differently to benefits at different parts of in
the accrual process. To capture this inconsistency, states can be divided into four categories based
on what types of benefits are under protection—past and future benefits, past and possibly future
benefits, only past benefits, or none (Munnell and Quinby 2012).

31

The dataset excludes Washington, given its numerous tiers, as well as Tennessee and Connecticut, due to biannual
reporting.
32
For their classifications, Munnell and Quinby (2012) rely on Cloud (2011), Monahan (2010), NCPERS (2007),
Mumford and Pareja (1997), Reinke (2011), Staman (2011), Sinko (1996), as well as discussions with legal counsels of
state retirement systems.
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Table #9
Legal Protections of Public Pension Benefits
Constitution

Contract
Alabama
California
Georgia
Kansas
Massachusetts
Nevada
New
Hampshire
North Dakota
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Vermont
West Virginia

Maine
Wyoming

Arizona

Colorado
Idaho
Maryland
Mississippi
New Jersey
Rhode Island
South
Carolina

New Mexico
Ohio

Past &
Future

Past &
maybe
Future

Hawaii
Louisiana
Michigan

Past

Property

Alaska
Illinois
New York

None

Promissory
Gratuity Estoppel
Minnesota

Wisconsin

Indiana
Texas

Source: Munnell and Quinby (2012)

Table 10 provides summary statistics and source information for data of the empirical
analysis. The Public Pension Database (2010) or PPD is compiled by the Retirement Research
Center at Boston College and the National Association of Retirement Administrators. Funding
ratios and participation numbers are cumulative for the large state-level plans that are included in the
PPD. State population numbers are from the U.S. Census Bureau. The state debt data from Moody’s
(2010) excludes unfunded liabilities, avoiding covariance with the funding ratio variable. The
Wisconsin Legislature’s Survey of public pension plans provides sufficient data to estimate the
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minimum retirement age for a public worker with ten years of employment 33 and to create a binary
indicator variable for Social Security participation. Hirsch and MacPherson (2010) estimate union
membership for public sector workers, but do not distinguish between local, state, or federal
government workers. The author uses Bureau of Labor estimates of federal workforce per state and
a national federal union membership participation rate to isolate public sector union membership at
the state and local levels of government. The U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of PublicEmployee Retirement Systems provides data on investment earnings as well as benefit levels.
Table #10
Summary Statistics
Variable
Retirement Age
Benefit Level
Fund Ratio
Debt
Percent Population
Public Union
Right to Work
No Social Security
Investments

3.6

Description
Youngest possible retirement age for a person
with ten years employment
Benefits Paid to Number of Beneficiaries
Cumulative for large plans in PPD

Source
Wisconsin Legislative Surveys: 20002010
U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of
Public-Employee Retirement Systems
Public Pension Database

State Debt to State Income

Moody's (2010)

Plan Members to State Population

Public Pension Database and U.S.
Census Bureau
Author estimate: based on data from
Hirsch and MacPherson (2010) and the
U.S. Department of Labor

Percent of state and local government worker
who are members of a union
Indicator Variable: one if state has right to
work
Indicator Variable: one if state has a large plan Wisconsin Legislative Surveys: 2000that does not participate in the Social Security 2010
Investment Earnings per Beneficiary
U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of
Public-Employee Retirement Systems

Mean

Minimum Maximum Std Dev

62.01

55

67

2.34

18.49

9.183

32.256

4.793

82.988

39.167

117.93

14.602

2.936

0

12.1

2.175

0.076

0.0268

0.15

0.0241

0.327

0.0311

0.744

0.191

0.447

0

1

0.498

0.255

0

1

0.437

13.291

-154.53

153.23

38.401

Empirical Results
Causation is a concern with most institutional studies. This paper assumes that the legal

protections influence pension characteristics, given that most state constitutional amendments
predate the sample period by thirty years. Judicial rulings being more independent from the political
process than legislative action, one could further assume that all legal factors are determined
exogenously. Public pension funding was poor or nonexistent until the late 1970s and reached a
peak during the asset price boom of the late 1990s. The years from 2001 to 2010, the sample period,
lies between the dot-com boom of the nineties and aggressive pension reforms following the
33

Retirement age estimations do not include early retirement.
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financial crisis of 2007-2008. Thus, pension funding during the sample period is somewhat
exogenous to the preceding and later environments.
The paper estimates special interest group models to further explore the influences of legal
institutions that protect benefits. The empirical estimations focus on three pension variables—
retirement age, benefit levels, and funding ratio—that likely draw the attention of public sector
unions. Union members prefer younger retirement ages, providing the option of more recreational
utility and longer payouts of retirement income. Of course, benefit levels draw the attention for
public sector unions, being a large component of a public employee’s compensation package. Public
pension systems are complex institutions, relying on complex accounting principles and actuarial
methods. Public worker special interest groups are more incentivized than politicians or voters to
become informed of the exact solvency risks of a pension fund, since they will incur substantial
costs in an insolvency scenario. Thus, public sector special interest groups, to the extent that they
focus on the long-term, can provide helpful guidance to pension managers and state legislatures,
discouraging pension underfunding. Pension funding is a likely objective of public sector unions, if
they focus on the long-term, since money put away in the present increases probability of pension
payments in the future as well as increases the expected value of the future payments if government
promises are not assumed to be risk-free.
Table 11 provides the regression results for a special interest group model of retirement age.
Public union membership corresponds negatively to retirement age as expected. However, the
portion of public sector workers in state population appears to a have positive impact on
retirement—perhaps a structural result. States that do not participate in the Social Security system
for public workers have lower retirement ages, given that non-participatory public plans may be
better managed, and the respective state legislatures do not shirk their required contributions. Ample
pension funds might allow for earlier retirements by public employees in these more prudent states.
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To compare the coefficients of the indicator variables of legal protections, constitutional law
and property interest are insignificant and consequently indistinguishable from the rest of the
sample. Contract law, a strong protector of benefits, and gratuity theory, the weakest protector of
benefits, have a negative point estimate and a positive point estimate, respectively. The indicator
variables of the types of benefits protected provide a more lineal representation of benefit
protection strength. Stronger protections correspond to lower retirement age, and weaker
protections correspond to higher retirement ages.

Table #11
Retirement Age
Fund Ratio
Debt
Percent Population
Public Union
Right to Work
No Social Security
Constitutional Law
Contract Theory
Property Interest
Gratuity Theory
Past and Future

1
0.035***
(0.0069)
-0.12***
(0.047)
26.75***
(3.75)
-5.23***
(0.71)
-1.04***
(0.28)
-1.64***
(0.21)

2
0.035***
(0.0069)
-0.12***
-0.048
26.77***
-3.81
-5.23***
(0.71)
-1.04***
(0.28)
-1.64***
(0.21)
-0.007
(0.28)

3
0.036***
(0.007)
-0.13***
(0.05)
22.9***
(3.95)
-5.59***
(0.71)
-1.04***
(0.27)
-1.73***
(0.21)

4
0.035***
(0.007)
-0.12***
(0.047)
26.59***
(3.95)
-5.22***
(0.71)
-1.03***
(0.28)
-1.64***
(0.21)

5
0.037***
(0.007)
-0.10**
(0.046)
29.26***
(3.73)
-4.89***
(0.70)
-0.093***
(0.27)
-1.74***
(0.21)

6
0.030***
(0.006)
-0.19***
(0.04)
25.24***
(3.50)
-2.92***
(0.72)
-0.65***
(0.26)
-1.47***
(0.20)

7
8
0.037*** 0.028***
(0.007)
(0.007)
-0.14*** -0.15***
(0.04)
(0.046)
24.56***
29.2
(3.90)
(3.68)
-5.03***
-4.49
(3.90)
(0.71)
-0.99***
-0.98
(0.71)
(0.26)
-1.61*** -1.61***
(0.27)
(0.21)

-0.6***
(0.21)
0.041
(0.31)
1.84***
(0.44)
-1.52***
(0.18)

Past and Possibly Future

0.44**
(0.22)

Past Only
R-squared
0.369
0.369
0.38
0.369
0.392
0.453
F-Statistic
17.7
16.6
17.4
16.6
18.3
23.4
Note: OLS Regression results with fixed time effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.

0.374
16.9

0.96***
(0.19)
0.402
19
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The statistical results of the special interest group variables and legal protection indicator
variables on benefit levels are shown in Table 12. Public union membership has a statistically
significant positive point estimate as expected. Likewise, the results confirm that plans without
Social Security provide larger levels of pension benefits to retirees. The legal doctrine indicator
variables are statistically insignificant. States that protect future and past benefits as well as states that
protect only past benefits pay lower average benefits as shown in columns 6 and 8, yet states with
unclear protections have larger benefits in column 7. Perhaps, the pension systems in these states are
better managed, and the laws in these states are unclear because public sector unions have not posed
any lawsuits.
Table #12
Benefit Levels
Fund Ratio
Debt
Percent Population
Public Union
Right to Work
No Social Security
Constitutional Law
Contract Theory
Property Interest
Gratuity Theory

1
0.032**
(0.012)
0.44***
(0.084)
-0.31
(6.73)
9.96***
(1.27)
1.26**
(0.49)
4.11***
(0.38)

2
0.032**
(0.012)
0.44***
(0.086)
0.032
(6.84)
10.05***
(1.33)
1.28**
(0.50)
4.12***
(0.39)
-0.12
(0.49)

3
0.032**
(0.012)
0.44***
(0.084)
1.4
(7.16)
10.12***
(1.29)
1.25**
(0.49)
4.15***
(0.39)

4
0.033***
(0.013)
0.44***
(0.084)
1.2
(7.09)
9.88***
(1.28)
1.21**
(0.49)
4.12***
(0.38)

5
0.031**
(0.012)
0.42***
(0.084)
-1.3
(6.83)
9.82***
(1.28)
1.21**
(0.49)
4.15***
(0.38)

6
0.029**
(0.012)
0.40***
(0.085)
-1.09
(6.71)
11.1***
(1.37)
1.45***
(0.49)
4.19***
(0.38)

7
0.05***
(0.011)
0.31***
(0.077)
-18.73***
(6.35)
11.66***
(1.16)
1.67***
(0.44)
4.36***
(0.35)

8
0.045***
(0.045)
0.49***
(0.82)
-5.11
(6.59)
8.51***
(1.26)
1.14***
(0.47)
4.05***
(0.37)

0.27
(0.38)
-0.38
(0.56)
-0.72
(0.81)

Past and Future

-0.78**
(0.35)

Past and Possibly Future

3.68***
(0.36)

Past Only
R-squared
0.514
0.514
0.514
0.514
0.515
F-Statistic
30
30
30
30
30
Note: OLS Regression results with fixed time effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.

0.519
30.6

0.60
43.2

-1.87***
(0.34)
0.544
33.8
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The statistical results in Table 11 and Table 12 show no significant difference between states
that have constitutional amendments and states that do not in regards to benefit levels and
retirement age. In column 2 of Table 13, the constitutional law indicator variable has a statistically
significant negative point estimate. The coefficient for property interest is positive and significant,
indicating that states with property interest are better funded; the result could derive from a
tendency of states without Social Security participation to use property interest as an interpretation
of benefits. The coefficient estimates for debt and public sector unions are statistically significant
with their expected signs in column 1 of Table 13. The positive coefficient for the “past and
possible” indicator variable in column 7 likely results from the fact that a well-funded pension plan
is the source of the legal uncertainty. Of course, legal challenges by public sector unions result from
legislative attempts to reduce pension benefits, which is likely a response to pension underfunding.
The statistical analysis explores the legal protections of public pension benefits and their
influence on pension characteristics in multiple special interest group models. Unclear legal
protections are indicative of a lack of legal activity in the area of public pension benefits—most
likely due to sufficiently funded pension plans. In addition, union strength or public sector influence
might be the cause of the correspondence between lower retirement ages and stronger benefit
protections.
The statistical and economic significance of the point estimate for the constitutional law
indicator variable in Table 13 suggests that constitutional protections of public pension benefits
reduce the funding levels of plans, thereby increasing insolvency risk. This result is counterintuitive,
and important to policy makers and other pension stakeholders. If constitutional protections lead to
pension underfunding that leads to insolvency and lower benefit payments, constitutional
protections may be undesirable because they fail to achieve their intended objective—pension
benefit security.
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Table #13
Funding Ratio
Debt
Percent Population
Public Union
Right to Work
No Social Security

1
-0.56***
(0.32)
-1.84
(25.52)
13.3***
(4.78)
6.20***
(1.82)
-6.54***
(1.41)

Constitutional Law
Contract Theory

2
3
-0.36
0.56*
(0.086)
(0.084)
10.39
0.102
(25.7)
(27.16)
17.18*** 13.48***
(4.94)
(1.29)
7.32***
6.2***
(1.85)
(1.43)
-5.88*** -6.49***
(1.42)
(1.43)
-5.17***
(1.84)
0.303
(1.43)

Property Interest
Gratuity Theory
Past and Future

4
-0.51
(0.31)
-29.31
(26.52)
14.5***
(4.74)
7.19***
(1.82)
-6.69***
(1.40)

5
-0.62*
(0.32)
-7.01
(25.8)
12.6***
(4.81)
5.95***
(1.83)
-6.3***
(1.42)

6
-0.67**
(0.32)
-4.53
(25.5)
17.3***
(5.14)
6.82***
(1.84)
-6.17***
(0.38)

7
-0.37
(0.32)
23.25
(26.30)
10.66**
(4.79)
5.48***
(1.81)
-6.82***
(0.35)

6.69***
(2.06)
-3.79
(3.06)
-2.72**
(1.32)

Past and Possibly Future

3.68***
(1.48)

Past Only
Oberservations
470
470
470
470
470
470
470
R-squared
0.246
0.259
0.246
0.265
0.249
0.253
0.264
F-Statistic
10.6
10.6
9.9
10.9
10
10.3
10.9
Note: OLS Regression results with fixed time effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.

3.7

8
-0.69**
(0.31)
12.9
(25.2)
17.2***
(4.76)
6.26***
(1.78)
-6.10***
(1.39)

-5.71***
(1.28)
470
0.278
11.6

Concluding Remarks
This paper looks at the legal environment for public pension benefit protections, discussing

relevant topics such as state bankruptcy and current pension litigation. In addition, the paper
examines the influences of the various legal interpretations of the public pension promise at the
state-level on the funding ratios, benefit levels, and retirement ages. The empirical results suggest
that constitutional provisions may negatively impact funding ratios, but the influences of legal
protections on the plans’ retirement ages and benefit levels are more ambiguous.

76

The public pension landscape in the United States with its variety of benefit protections can
be used to draw broader conclusions on the constitutionalization of government promises. If
constitutionalization reduces monitoring by recipients, its ultimate effect will be a negative one. An
insolvent state will probably be unable to pay pensioners in full whether constitutional protections
of benefits are in place or not. If constitutional constraints on government obligations discourage
prefunding, their eventual effects on the constitutionalized payments may be negative. Nonetheless,
lower funding ratios of public pension plans with constitutional protections of benefits may be a
tradeoff of risks between public employees and public employers.
Policymakers have shown a tendency in recent years to pay bondholders ahead of public
pensioners in order to preserve lower interest rates for future borrowing. Thus, the political channel
offers a weaker means of protection for public pensioners than previously thought. As state budgets
continue to face substantial constraints, protections of public pension promises likely will wane in
most states. Thus, the ultimate effect of constitutional protections remains unclear until current
litigations reach conclusions.
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